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As efforts are made to reduce dropouts among high school students, school choice 
remains a hotly debated policy. The subject is complicated by an apparent gender gap in 
the academic performance of boys and girls. As girls outperform boys in most subjects, 
such a policy might affect them differently. When students compete with grades, we 
would expect to see an increased clustering of girls in the best and most popular 
schools. Conversely, if boys have to settle for second- and third-tier schools more often, 
it might explain low motivation and high dropout rates among this group. This thesis 
exploit a policy change in Hordaland in 2005 to examine two topics: Firstly I look at the 
effect of increased choice on high school dropout rates. Secondly I explore whether the 
effects are heterogeneous for gender. Results suggests that in the wake of the reform 
dropout rates increased for students in academic track programs, with the strongest 
effect being present among boys. These results are substantiated by indications of 
similar effects in several other counties that implemented reforms of this kind.   
 
All calculations and estimations were performed using Microsoft Excel and Stata IC 14.  
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Girls continue to outperform boys in academic settings. The reversal of the educational 
gender gap is present across borders and cultures, and does not seem to diminish in 
strength. Male students perform worse in most observable outcomes, such as grades, 
test scores, dropout rates and in obtaining higher education. This is no different in 
Norwegian schools. Data from the Norwegian Directory of Education and Training 
(2016) shows that female students score equal to, or better than their counterparts in 
every core subject at every grade. At the university level 42.3 % of woman age 19-24 
were in higher education in 2016, compared to 27.2 % of men in the same age group 
(Statistics Norway, 2016b). This is not new, but despite the international trend we do 
not fully understand the cause. There is still debate on whether the boys are declining, 
or simply stagnating, being surpassed by soaring cohorts of female classmates. 
Although interest in the subject has increased in recent years no consensus has yet been 
reached, neither in economics nor other disciplines. The aim of this thesis is to add 
another piece to the puzzle and contribute to our understanding of why boys lag behind 
in the classroom.  
 
A key policy objective in recent years has been to reduce the dropout rates from the 
secondary educational level. We observe that boys far outnumber girls in this category, 
with those in vocational track programs being most at risk. This potential gender gap 
comes with both private and social costs. For the individual, poor academic 
performance lingers throughout life. In the work place they run the risk of earning lower 
wages, with fewer possibilities to advance professionally than they otherwise might1. 
Those dropping out may fall outside the labor market completely, reducing tax revenue 
and increasing government spending on welfare. This direct cost is coupled with the 
indirect cost of inefficient use of resources. If the school system has students graduating 
with lower skills and lesser knowledge than they could have, the economy miss out on 
potential output. Hence, poor academic performance, from any group, can hinder 
economic growth in the long run. Policymakers should therefore have an interest in 
                                                 
1 The effect of education on earnings is well established. See for example Kirkeboen et. al (2016). 
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research on this topic, perhaps so that changes can be made to increase the performance 
of schools and promote efficiency.  
 
One of the main discussions of principals in Norwegian educational policy is how to 
determine admissions to high school. The system varies from county to county, and is 
generally centered on the question of school choice. This is similar to ongoing debates 
in other countries, for example Sweden and India2. The experiences from these 
countries are mixed, and remain controversial. Whether school choice is advantageous 
for students or not is hotly debated in national media, especially if being able to choose 
which high school to attend makes students more or less likely to drop out.  
 
To explore this issue, I exploit a policy change in the county Hordaland in 2005 
introducing school choice in high school education. The topic of research is two-folded: 
By comparing with counties were policy did not change, I try to isolate the effect of 
more choice on high school dropout rates. Secondly, I focus on differences between 
boys and girls, under the hypothesis that the policy might affect them differently. By 
effectively creating a market for education, where students compete with grades, school 
choice can prove favorable to female students. As girls outperform boys in most 
subjects we would expect to see an increased clustering of girls in the best and most 
popular schools. We would also expect boys to have to settle for their second or third 
option to a greater degree than girls. Failure to earn admittance to their preferred school 
might help explain faltering motivation and higher dropout rates among boys. If modern 
school systems are better suited to girls’ preferences, school choice could exacerbate a 
gender divide present among adolescents. It could also prove consequential for labor 
market outcomes in the long term if boys fail to obtain their preferred level of 
education. 
 
In the spirit of Card and Krueger (1994), Autor (2003) and other seminal empirical 
work, I employ a difference-in-differences framework, using comprehensive, 
aggregated data from Statistics Norway’s “Statistical Bank”. Data is available at the 
                                                 
2 See Lindbohm (2010) and Rao (2013) for examples on the topic. 
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county level, divided by gender and type of educational track, providing a solid 
foundation for an analysis of this kind. Additional data on covariates is also collected 
from the same database. This approach contributes to the ongoing research on the 
educational gender gap, as well as a fresh perspective on the Norwegian debate. 
 
Results indicate an adverse effect on students in academic track high school programs. 
Regression analysis estimates that the reform increased dropout rates by 1.7 – 2.7 % for 
boys, and 1.2 – 1.4 % for girls. I conduct several robustness tests to validate the results, 
in which they prove to be consistent. The framework is however unable to identify 
similar effects among students in vocational track programs as pre-treatment trends does 
not allow for suitable control groups. Early evaluations of the reform suggests that more 
choice has allowed for skill sorting, with stronger students displacing the weaker ones 
in the popular Bergen schools. A clustering of low-skills students in the second tier 
schools has in turn affected the educational environment. Existing literature has found 
boys to be more vulnerable to such inputs, letting their peer-group influence their 
academic performance. This might explain why we seem to observe a greater increase 
in dropouts among boys than for girls after the reform. Signs of similar effects are also 
found in other counties who implemented reforms of this kind, which substantiates the 
conclusions of this thesis.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the existing 
literature and theoretical assessments of the educational gender gap and the effects of 
school choice. Chapter 3 presents the Norwegian school system to provide context for 
the analysis. The political environment around the reform is also discussed here. 
Chapter 4 describes the data on which the analysis is performed. Chapter 5 details the 
research design and identification strategy. Chapter 6 reports the result, while Chapter 7 




2 Literary review 
 
Providing high quality education efficiently is an obvious objective for most countries. 
As competition grows increasingly global, high-cost countries must develop highly 
skilled workers in order to compete in the marketplace. The foundation for this 
development stem from primary and secondary education. Sub-par results from cross-
country studies such as PISA, suggests that many high-development countries still have 
room for improvement3. As such, how to best organize the educational system continues 
to be of interest in the economic literature. A recurring topic is the benefits, or lack of 
such, of freedom to choose your own school, thus promoting competition and perhaps 
efficiency gains. The stagnation of male academic performance is a warning sign that 
educational policy in developed countries may not be optimal. As the magnitude of the 
gender gap is becoming increasingly well documented focus is shifting towards causal 
factors, yet conclusive evidence is scarce. In this chapter I look at the existing literature 
and how it relates to the case study of school choice in Hordaland. The thesis adds to a 
continuing debate in the literature, both on school choice and gender gaps.  
 
2.1 The gender gap in education 
The discrepancy in male and female academic performance has gotten the attention of 
both politicians and scholars. A summary of meta studies and cross-country analyses  
from Backe-Hansen and Walhovd (2014) concludes that girls in general do better than 
boys, and especially ay reading skills. The gap is smallest in mathematics and science, 
where some studies find that boys outperform girls (EURYDICE, 2010). Nordahl et al. 
(2016) find that boys score significantly lower than girls in teacher-evaluated 
performance, to an extent that amounts to half a school year in educational output. 
Interestingly the discrepancy widens with age, meaning that the girls are increasingly 
outperforming their counterparts as they progress through the school system. Backe-
Hansen and Walhovd find no substantial difference at the start of the educational track, 
but by the time students reach the upper secondary level, girls on average perform better 
                                                 
3 In the latest PISA study in 2015 Norway ranked 19th in math, 23rd in science and 9th in reading. For 
comparison, the US ranked 40th, 24th and 24th in the same categories, the UK ranked 27th, 14th and 22nd, 
while Sweden ranked 24th, 27th and 17th respectively (OECD, 2016). 
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at most skills and subjects. The difference is not huge, but has been consistent for some 
time, which is cause for concern. Other developed countries observe similar trends, 
which suggests that this is a multilateral phenomenon. For example, Autor et al. (2016) 
reports that in 2011 female college completion rates exceeded the male rate in 29 of 34 
OECD-countries. Autor and Wasserman (2013, p.3) describes the reversal of the gender 
gap in the US as a “tectonic shift”. In their summary, they write that “over the last three 
decades, the labor market trajectory of males in the U.S. has turned downward along 
four dimensions: skills acquisition, employment rates, occupational stature and real 
wage levels”. Females have surpassed males by a significant margin in obtaining higher 
education, they are more likely to complete high school, get better grades, are less likely 
to be unemployed and their real wages are increasing compared to men with similar 
levels of education. Autor and Wasserman argue that even though a minority of men 
still reach the highest echelons of the labor market and accumulate wealth at a 
disproportionate rate compared to women, the life outcomes of the median male in the 
US is worsening. 
 
A manifestation of the gender gap appears in high school dropout rates. Backe-Hansen 
and Walhovd (2014) find that male students are more likely to fail to complete their 
secondary education than girls. In particular, students with low academic achievement 
and those in a vocational track education seem to be most at risk, with boys 
outnumbering girls in both groups. Reports from Lillejord et al. (2015) and Byrhagen et 
al. (2006) note that grade average is an important indicator for future educational 
outcomes. The former finds that 99 % of students earning a grade point average (GPA) 
of 5.5 (out of a possible 6) or higher in middle school completed high school, while 
only 13 % of those earning a 2.5 or lower did the same. The research referenced also 
find that an increase in GPA by one grade increases the likelihood of completing high 
school by 30 %. This link between grades and dropouts is interesting when considering 
the gender gap. In my thesis I expand on these findings, and try to connect the gap in 
academic performance to the gap in dropout rates through the introduction of 
competition in the educational market. Specifically I hypothesize that the 
disproportionate male dropout rate might come as a result of low-performing boys 
failing to earn admission to their preferred school more often than girls, with the result 
being an increased risk of quitting. 
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Several other hypotheses have been presented in the literature as to why the gender gap 
has emerged. Broadly, they can be divided in two categories: Behavioral and cognitive 
differences between the genders, and social and organizational factors in disfavor of 
male students. The former has seen an influx of papers in later years as researchers try 
to explain the discrepancy by how boys and girls approach and acquire knowledge. 
Some data suggests that boys are more susceptible to let unstable home environments, 
or a low-income background translate into lower academic performance. Often cited is a 
paper by Bertrand and Pan (2013) that finds that boys from broken homes perform 
worse than students from two-parent households, and are more sensitive to poor 
parental inputs than girls. This can be linked to the acquisition and development of 
important non-cognitive skills, which tend to suffer in households with only one parent. 
They argue that skills like study habits, perseverance and self-control matters 
significantly when it comes to academic performance, while also being strongly 
correlated with gender. Boys are more likely to display disruptive behavior, or be 
diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder, resulting in lower absorption of the 
curriculum. This early grade behavior may lay the foundation for the diverging 
educational progress between boys and girls, ultimately resulting in higher dropout rates 
at the secondary level. Autor et al. (2016) expands by investigating if boys display the 
same heightened sensitivity to school inputs. By comparing siblings of opposite gender 
enrolled at the same school they are able to examine how the brother and sister responds 
to the quality of the school they attend, for example after a move. The results show that 
boys benefit more from being exposed to a higher quality school environment than girls, 
although both genders perform better when attending better schools4. This indicates that 
boys, in addition to background and home environment, are more vulnerable to poor 
educational input. Furthermore, a paper from Legewie and DiPrete (2012) demonstrates 
that boys are more sensitive to the composition of their peer group. Specifically, male 
peer groups vary with socioeconomic status, while female groups do not. In high quality 
schools the academic environment appears to be more learning oriented, shaping and 
channeling the ‘masculine culture’ among boys towards competition in school 
performance and achievement. In lower-quality schools, they argue that the same 
masculinity translates to disruptive behavior, at the cost of diminished learning. Their 
                                                 
4 The paper employs a measure of school-level “gain score” detailing how much students benefit from 
attending that particular school in observable test scores. This measurement is done by the Florida 
Department of Education, from which the data is collected. 
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female classmates were not found to have similar variations as they conclude that “boys, 
in particular, benefit from school resources that create a learning-oriented peer culture” 
(Legewie and DiPrete 2012, p.464). If low-performing males are clustered in certain 
schools, these results suggest that the effect on dropout rates might be more severe for 
boys than for girls in the same situation. As pure school choice allows for greater 
segregation in abilities, we could also expect to see greater segregation between 
genders. If many boys are limited to second-tier schools, a lab experiment from Almås 
et al. (2016) might explain why these are more at risk than others. Different 
characteristics influence the risk of dropping out for boys and girls, where male students 
that reported a high degree of confidence completed their secondary education at a 
higher rate than others. Research also suggests that confidence is linked to academic 
motivation, learning and achievement (Shoemaker, 2010, Taurina, 2015)5. These results 
might be an expression of boys with lower mastery of core skills feeling less confident 
in their academic prowess, subsequently being at greater risk of dropping out. Girls on 
the other hand rely more on the long-term prospects of education, perhaps contributing 
to more determination and motivation than their fellows. If in fact boys let 
disadvantages of background, social interactions and education quality affect their 
academic performance to a greater degree than girls, we might understand why 
motivation and confidence suffers more often at advanced levels of study. 
 
The latter category of hypotheses focus on systemic elements of education, and how 
they might influence genders differently. Results such as those in Nordahl et al. (2016) 
and Legewie and DiPrete (2012) underscore the notion that the decline of male students 
corresponds with a ‘feminization’ and ‘suppressing’ of masculine culture and behavior 
in the school system. The problem, some argue, is schools failing to engage boys by 
teaching to their interests and strengths, relying on principles more suited to a female 
preference for learning. For example, Dee (2005) shows that students perform better 
with teachers of the same gender, while Sikora (2014) finds that single-sex schools 
helps reduce gender stereotypes in post-educational career paths6. Since a majority of 
teachers at the primary and lower secondary level are female, the belief is that this 
                                                 
5 Psychologists would preferably use the term ‘self-efficacy’ in this setting, which Shoemaker (2010, 
p.687) defines as “a belief in one’s capability to learn or perform behaviors at designated levels”.  
6 Boys showed a larger propensity for choosing life-science based occupations when coming from a 
single-sex school, while girls were more likely to pursue physical sciences. 
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favors girls as the needs and wants of male students fail to be identified. Some 
Norwegian studies focus on an increases emphasis on the individual responsibility of 
learning, which has led to less collective teaching and a more floating structure of 
schooling7. While it reflects the changing demands of the labor market, it can also be 
thought to favor girls as they tend to be motivated by the learning itself, while boys rely 
more on external motivation from the group or the teacher. On the other hand, a 
thorough analysis by Bakken (2008) concludes that there is little evidence that the 
organization of the school system creates gendered differences in performance, but it 
may recreate and accentuate differences already present in the class. A compelling 
argument is that the same gender gap appears in countries all over the world, with vast 
variations in how the school system is designed. They have also been persistent over 
time, despite recent efforts to address the issue. The hypothesis that one specific set of 
policies or values, whether explicit or implicit, should be the cause of the divergence 
therefore seems improbable. In the report they note that according to Brophy (1985) the 
critique of the ‘feminine school’ is almost a century old, while Francis and Skelton 
(2005) points out that the term’s political motivation makes it difficult to infer what it 
specifically entails. Of empirical research Bakken (2008) found little that supported, or 
even sought out to test, whether a ‘feminine school’ cause boys to perform worse. The 
floating and vague nature of the concept may be difficult to test in an analytical setting, 
and the cause of why it has seen little interest among economists.  
  
2.2 The effect of school choice  
This thesis studies a case of increased choice in the educational market. In the 
application of economic theory on the provision of education, a long standing claim is 
that more choice will promote competition and efficiency in the school sector. Friedman 
(1962) is an early example in which he proposes the idea of a voucher, with which 
parents could choose the preferred school for their child to attend. The government 
would then pay the cost of the child’s enrolment, regardless of public or private 
ownership. Friedman believed that the increased competition between schools to attract 
students would spur a competitive market for education, pushing private and public 
institutions both to improve in order to ensure adequate enrolment and funding. For 
instance, the competition might urge schools to invest more resources in their staff, 
                                                 
7 Notably Nordahl (2007) and Øia (2007) 
9 
 
improve school facilities, be more open to alternative pedagogical practices, or any 
other measure aimed to raising the quality of schooling supplied at their respective 
institutions. In doing so, increasing the students’ ability to choose would not only mean 
increased opportunities for the individual, but also improve the educational output for 
the system as a whole, converting to higher economic growth in the long run.  
 
A number of previous studies aim to measure these perceived benefits from increased 
freedom of choice in education. If this is the case we would expect to see improvements 
in measurable outcomes, such as completion rates and student performance. Figlio and 
Hart (2014) is a recent example, where they examine if students in schools exposed to 
competition from private actors perform better on observable test scores. The results 
indicate that more competition is related to improved performance, an improvement that 
only occurs after choice is introduced. They also find the effect to be progressive, where 
the schools most at risk of losing students saw the greatest effects. Lavy (2010) finds 
the same reduction in dropout rates among public schools in Tel-Aviv when choice is 
introduced, while Angrist et. al (2002) exploits a natural experiment in the voucher 
lottery system of Colombia to find that recipients were more likely to have completed 
8th grade and improved test scores. The latter’s cost-benefit analysis concluded that the 
gains of the winners exceeded the governmental cost per voucher, increasing net 
welfare. A relatable case to Hordaland is the 1992 school reform in Sweden8, where a 
voucher system gave access to the so-called ‘independent schools’9. Two decades later, 
Lindbom (2010) reports that the overall effects have been marginal, both with regards to 
student performance and costs. On the other hand, a comprehensive analysis of national 
test scores and final marks found a significant and positive, but modest, relationship 
between academic performance and the availability of independent schools (Bergström 
and Sandström, 2001, Ahlin, 2003). This is consistent with studies from other countries 
where schools exposed to competition from private institutions are generally found to 
perform better than other schools10. Consequently, areas with a high degree of school 
choice correspond with higher test-scores and lower costs per student. These effects can 
                                                 
8 Both supporters and opponents of school choice in the Norwegian public debate often use the ‘Sweden 
example’. Norway and Sweden’s school systems are in many ways founded on similar principals and 
structure. 
9 An independent school separates from the traditional private school in that it is not allowed to charge 
fees from the parents or its students, but must accept the government voucher as payment in full. 
10 Greene and Winters (2003), and Hoxby (1998, 2001) are good examples 
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also be found in Norwegian studies, where students exposed to school choice have been 
found to improve their academic performance, for instance by earning better grades11.  
 
Although research finds efficiency gains from allowing competition, a common 
objection is that more choice can lead to adverse segregational effects. When grades 
determine admission, a pertinent example is the sorting of students after skill, 
effectively creating ‘A’ and ‘B’ schools. Opponents often cite the practice of ‘cream 
skimming’, where the best schools only select students from certain preferred groups, as 
a reason for increased costs and poor quality in public education12. As Robert (2010) 
note, although school choice shows signs of improving both student and school 
performance overall, the effect is strongest for those from high status households where 
parents hold a more informed preference for academic quality. The consequence for 
policy-makers is a trade-off between efficiency and equality in the supply of education. 
In a seminal paper, Epple and Romano (1998) discuss how peer-effects influence 
students’ performance. Their model suggests that more choice inevitably results in some 
form of sorting of students, with those with low income and ability being the most 
likely to remain in public school. Overall, students in private school benefit from having 
high-ability peers, and “because vouchers increase the premium on ability, the greatest 
proportionate gains from the voucher accrue to low-income, high-ability students” 
(Epple and Romano, 1998 p. 55). In a school choice reform, positive spill-over effects 
could represent a gain in schools dominated by students from homes with highly 
educated, high income parents, but it is unclear if the effect is large enough to outweigh 
a conversely negative effects on those left in weaker institutions.  
 
Boys and minorities are examples of groups overrepresented in the weakest segments of 
the student population. Through the cream-skimming process of a school choice system 
we would expect these to be clustered in what is perceived as the second, and third tier 
schools. Lindbom and Almgren (2007) provides a rigorous examination of 
compositional effects after the Swedish reform. They find that although the overall 
effects were marginal, data suggested that the consequences were most prominent in 
                                                 
11 See Haraldsvik (2012 and Brugård (2013) 
12 See for example Altonji et. al (2015) or Barrett and Boaz (1996). 
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disadvantaged areas, where there were signs of fewer students whose parents were 
employed or Swedish nationals, more students with low grades and fewer girls enrolled 
in the schools13. Similarly, a report from Lødding and Helland (2007) finds a 
distributional effect in the weaker segments of the student distribution when changing to 
free choice system. Those with lowest abilities and grades seemed to benefit the most 
from a geography-based admission principle, being more evenly distributed in the 
hierarchy of schools than with school choice. Guneriussen (2012) finds that the 
‘unpopular’ schools typically have a larger concentration of minority students, who on 
average get lower grades than natives. When competing for admission with their grades 
these students will be clustered in the ‘second tier’ schools, which are usually located in 
areas with low socioeconomic status and a high share of minority residents. It is 
reasonable to assume that similar arguments as those on the clustering of minority 
students can be extended to underachieving boys. This thesis argues that when grades 
are determinants for school admission, the sorting process can cluster boys, who on 
average get lower grades, in second tier schools, where negative peer-effects and 
educational inputs could lead to an increased dropout rate. Common for the Swedish 
and Norwegian studies is the focus on ethnic and socioeconomic segregation. Few, if 
any, discuss the distribution of gender in the presence of school choice. This provides 
motivation for the analysis of this thesis, which goes in further detail on gender 
differences than earlier papers. In general, surprisingly little research has been 
conducted on Norwegian data other than descriptive summaries of statistics. Fear of 
racial, social and academic sorting contribute to the fact that school choice remain 
controversial. Among economists however, the general sentiment is that there are 
benefits to increased competition among suppliers of education. A 2006 survey among 
PhD-members of the American Economic Association revealed that 67.1 % of the asked 
favored a voucher system, with support increasing if the system is limited to low-
income households or low-scoring schools (Whaples, 2006).              
 
                                                 
13 Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) finds additional evidence of modest segregational effects along 
socioeconomic and ethnic lines. Areas where the rate of students in private school is high, typically have 
a higher rate of students of a minority background enrolled in the public schools. 
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3 Institutional background 
     
3.1  Main principles and organization 
The Norwegian school is divided in three levels: elementary school (grades 1 -7), 
middle school (grades 8-10) and high school (grades VG1-VG3, i.e. 11-13), where the 
latter is of most interest for this thesis. Contrary to the first two, participation in this 
upper secondary education is voluntary, allowing for dropouts after the 10th grade14. 
However, all students in the age 16-23 has a statutory right to enrollment and schooling, 
assuming they have completed elementary and middle school. Grades are introduced in 
the 8th grade, and depending on the county form the basis on which admission to high 
school is decided. Although it is optional, career paths for those without a high school 
diploma are limited, and decreasing. As such, an objective for the Norwegian 
government is to ensure that more youths complete their secondary education. For 
many, high school education appears almost mandatory, and according to The 
Education Mirror for 2016 92 % of all 16 to 18-year-olds were enrolled in a high school 
at the start of the 2015/2016 school year (Norwegian Directory of Education and 
Training, 2017).  
 
After ‘The Knowledge Promotion Reform’ of 2006 students starting their upper 
secondary education have mainly two paths to a diploma. The first is through a ‘General 
Studies Program’ (GSP), a college track education preparing them for further studies at 
a tertiary institution. Upon completion the student is given university and college 
admission certification which is required in order to qualify for higher education. 
Anyone seeking this must therefore attend such a GSP, which tends to be the most 
popular option. The schooling in these programs is mainly theoretical, providing further 
specialization in core subjects such as science and languages as well as granting the 
students the freedom to choose electives. Alternatively, students can attend a 
‘Vocational Studies Program’ (VSP). The VSPs are two year programs, compared to 
GSPs three, leading to an apprenticeship within some sort of trade, lasting an additional 
two years. The vocational track education is usually more technical and practical in 
nature, where the objective is for students to be trained in a profession in which they can 
                                                 
14 Dropouts during the primary education do happen, but at a miniscule rate. In 2015/16 only 192 kids 
failed to participate in their compulsory schooling.  
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enter the labor market after the four years of education. For those who in addition want 
the admission certification for higher education can enter supplementary studies, either 
after the second year or after achieving their vocational qualification. These studies are 
designed to make up for the theoretical schooling missing in most VSPs, and has gained 
popularity in recent years. Conversely, vocational education has fallen in popularity, 
attendance and completion rates. This has led to political focus on participation in these 
programs, especially among low-skilled students who tend to be more prevalent in 
VSPs (UNEVOC, 2013). There are a total of 12 programs to choose from at the high 
school level, of which three are general programs and nine vocational programs. For the 
purpose of this thesis I only make a distinction between the two main categories, GSPs 
and VSPs.  
 
All public high schools are free and open to anyone. However, there is an ongoing 
debate concerning who should get priority when demand exceeds school capacity.  
Historically, students have enrolled at the school in the closest vicinity to their homes, 
as is usually the case in elementary and middle school. In the last three decades 
however, a growing faction of politicians have argued that students at the upper 
secondary level should have the right to choose for themselves which school they want 
to attend. As some schools are regarded as providing a higher quality of education, 
access to these ‘good schools’ should not be limited to those who happen to live near 
them, but rather be accessible to everyone. Deciding how access should be granted has 
been the basis for much controversy. While most of the Norwegian educational policy is 
crafted nationally by the Government and Parliament, the high school admission system 
is decided at the county level. Hence, systems vary and is subject to change depending 
on the political situation.  
 
In general, the systems counties use can be divided into two groups. The first operates 
with a free school choice system (FSC). In this group, students are eligible for 
enrolment at all high schools within the county, and apply to the school which he or she 
wishes to attend. At schools where applications exceed capacity admission is based on 
the student’s grade average from middle school. Thus, the most popular schools will 
require the best grades to be accepted. Since upper secondary education is a statutory 
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right, all who apply must get an offer from a school. However, those with poor 
academic performances in middle school may not get accepted at their first or second 
choice. The second group uses a geography based system, commonly called a proximity 
principle (PP). In its purest form students in PP counties are assigned admission to the 
school offering the program they wish to attend to which they live closest, often 
measured by length of commute. Freedom of choice under this system can be limited, 
but some allow students to change schools if there is capacity. Other counties employ a 
mix of the two systems. Several divide the county in ‘admission regions’ based on 
geography, with FSC within each region, while some give their students priority at their 
local school, but access to apply to any school they like. For the purpose of this analysis 
I categorize all counties who infringe on the free choice as a PP-county, including only 
counties where no restriction is imposed in the FSC-category.  
 
The first FSC counties made the change from the local school principle in the late 80’s 
and early 90’s. Since then others have followed at a steady pace. A summary of high 
school admission policy requested by the Parliament in 2003 revealed that nine of the 
19 counties employed a variant of FSC (Stortingets Utredningsseksjon, 2003). By 2016 
this number have risen to 12. As the majority of counties now offer more or less free 
choice in education pressure is rising in the remaining seven still basing their system on 
PP to offer the same degree of freedom. There has also been a push to make FSC 
available at a national level, meaning that every student would be able to apply any high 
school in the country, regardless of where they live. As of the writing of this thesis a 
proposal from the governmental parties to implement this right is making its way 
through a hearing process (Hansen and Børnes, 2016)  
 
3.2 Public and private schools 
Private schools have traditionally been a marginal part of the Norwegian school system. 
At the upper secondary level privately owned schools were banned up until 2005, unless 
they provided a religious or pedagogical alternative to the general public education. 
Christian free schools and educational concepts such as Steiner and Montesorri were 
thus allowed. After the law change in 2005 private regular high schools were allowed, 
which exposed the public school system to direct competition. Although private school 
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attendance increased in the following years, the share of students in public education 
remain fairly high compared to other countries. Per UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(2016) 7 % of Norwegian students in secondary education attended a private institution 
in 2014, compared to the OECD average of 17 % and world average of 25 %. Of the 
423 Norwegian high schools 92 are privately owned, but tend to be smaller than public 
schools, with less than a third the average number of students (Norwegian Directory of 
Education and Training, 2017). Most of these are still schools with an alternative 
educational philosophy or religious orientation, and dependent on governmental 
funding. Private institutions providing the same general education and curriculum as the 
public schools are few and mostly concentrated in the larger cities. Oslo has the highest 
proportions of students in private high schools at 16 %, while Hordaland has a 15 % 
share. For comparison, Aust-Agder and Sogn og Fjordane, two of least populated 
counties, have only 6 and 4 % of students in private schools respectively. 
 
3.3 Political background and environment 
Administratively, the 19 counties are responsible for providing upper secondary 
education, while the 428 municipalities are in charge of the compulsory education. 
Organizing and funding the schools is viewed as one of the most important task of local 
government, with significant portions of the budget being used on education15. Most 
guidelines are provided from the central government, leaving little opportunity for local 
politicians to influence the pedagogical principles of the school. The exception is the 
high school admission system, regarded as an organizational matter centrally. This has 
made the issue a key battleground in several counties, most notably in Hordaland and 
Oslo. For the latter, the admission system has changed seven times since 1982 as a 
result of a continuous tug of war between political parties (Guneriussen, 2012).  
 
The actors in the debate typically follow a traditional left-right axis, with the 
Conservative Party as the foremost proponents of FSC. Leaning on the arguments of 
Friedman (1962), they argue that competition can be used as a tool to promote 
                                                 




efficiency and prosperity16. They also emphasize the moral imperative of the issue, as it 
is both the students’ and parents’ fair right to choose the education which is best suited 
for their needs and preferences. The Labor Party are the most notable proximity 
principle advocates. Contrary to the Conservative Party, their main concern regarding 
school choice is the implicit establishment of first and second tier schools. In relation to 
results such as those in Epple and Romano (1998) they fear that grade based admissions 
will lead to an academic divide between those able to be accepted by the best schools, 
and those left behind in inferior schools. As the school system is designed to promote 
equality and unity across socioeconomic groups, school choice counteracts the core 
purpose of the ‘comprehensive school’. When competing with their GPA, only the best 
students truly have a free choice among schools. Thus, the Labor Party argue that a 
proximity principle is fairer as students gather at their local school, regardless of 
previous achievements or academic ambitions. The level of tension on the issue varies 
by county. Hordaland and Oslo remain the most hotly debated counties, while the issue 
seems resolved in other parts of the country. Rogaland, Vestfold and Sogn og Fjordane 
are examples of counties where school choice has been in effect for several decades, 
and is today regarded as uncontroversial across the political spectrum.  
 
3.4  The Hordaland reform 
After regaining the majority from the Labor Party in the 2003 Hordaland county 
election, the center-right coalition led by the Conservative Party vowed to remove the 
proximity principle in favor of school choice. The reform was approved the following 
fall, with school choice taking effect for students beginning their high school education 
in August of 2005. The decision was controversial and sparked great debate in local 
media where both Oslo and Sweden were cited as examples of school choice reforms 
where student performance and satisfaction suffered as a result17. The students however 
seemed pleased and welcomed the opportunity to choose their own school. In an early 
evaluation from the County Parliament, a survey revealed that over 60 % were generally 
pleased with new system, and only 13 % displeased (AUD, 2005).  
                                                 
16 See Fladset (2015) and Astrup and Røe Isaksen (2016) for remarks from the current Minister of 
Education from the Conservative Party, Torbjørn Røe Isaksen, on the benefits of choice. For the party’s 
official stance on the issue, see Høyre (2013) 
17 For examples of media coverage of the initial reform see articles such as Holmelid and Tomasgard 
(2004), Holmelid and Rossland (2004), Rambøl (2004) and Madsen (2004) 
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At the time of the reform there were 57 high schools in Hordaland, to which all students 
where eligible for enrollment after the policy changed18. Of these, 28 were placed in the 
administrative center, Bergen municipality, where the most popular ones are located in 
the city center. By Norwegian standards, Hordaland is a large, populous county, while 
Bergen is the second largest city in the country, dominating an otherwise rural 
population. In several areas, only one or two schools are within a reasonable commute, 
limiting the de facto choice available for its local students. School choice is first and 
foremost available for students in and around Bergen city where the supply of education 
is highest. As such, we should expect the effect of the reform to be strongest in the most 
urban areas where the competition between schools and students is toughest. In fact, the 
Parliament evaluation found that there were competition for admission among all GSP-
schools located in Bergen municipality, compared to only three in the rest of the county. 
It also reported that 39 % of students in Bergen, and 26 % of the county as a whole, had 
applied to a different school than their local one. Interestingly, the use of school choice 
was highest for those at the top and bottom of the grade distribution, with 35 % of those 
graduating with a GPA above 5 and 25 % of those below 2 not attending their local 
school. When asked about the importance of school choice over 60 % of the students 
responded that it was very important. In Bergen 46 % responded the same, suggesting 
that many students do not view school choice as a crucial issue, but choose to use it 
when given the opportunity19.   
 
An interesting trend observed in the years after the reform is the increased popularity of 
GSPs among students. Figure 1 shows a declining trend in the share of students 
choosing GSP in the first half of the decade, which is reversed into significant growth 
for the latter half. In Hordaland the share increases from 51.7 to 59.4 % from 2005-
2008, a trend that is also present nationally. This indicates a growing tendency among 
adolescents to choose academic track programs, which grants access to higher education 
after the completion of high school. The Norwegian Directory of Education and 
Training (2017) report that general study programs are by far the most popular choice 
                                                 
18 In 2001 there were 60, which by 2016 were reduced to 55. Of these 12 are private, one more than in 
2005. Brugård (2012 note that while the number of schools in Norway have been reduced the last 20 
years, it is usually the case of smaller schools merging so that the overall capacity is equal or better.  
19 Since no follow up have been conducted we do not have similar statistics on the use and satisfaction 
today, which might have changed significantly in years after as people adapt.  
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among students, and increasingly so in recent years. This implies that more students are 
chasing the same spots in the popular Bergen schools, inducing fiercer competition and 




The heightened competitiveness in schools in Bergen manifests in the distribution of 
boys and girls between schools. Figure 2 shows the total number of students of each 
gender attending the (primarily) GSP-schools in Bergen city center, illustrating how 
girls outnumber boys in this category. After the reform attendance for both genders 
increase for these schools, revealing a strong preference for the centrally located 
schools. This is also evident of an increase in supply as new, centrally placed schools 
opened in the latter half of the decade. The increase does however appear to be larger 
for girls than for boys. In AUD (2005), the evaluators report that the schools in the city 
center have the highest number of students for which the school is not their local one, a 
trend that is most apparent where the GPA-requirement for admission is highest. 
Outside of Bergen, students primarily attend the school which is geographically closest. 
As such, it appears that the reform allows for high-abilities student to attend the popular 
schools in Bergen, while other students choose schools outside the immediate city 
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center. Since boys are more likely to be in the lower segments of the grade distribution, 




Despite a seemingly satisfied youth population, these trends contributes to the system 
remaining controversial. As of 2017, a Labor-led coalition holds the majority once more 
after campaigning on the wish to replace FSC with a new system before the start of the 
school year in August. However, only minor adjustments to the current system have so 
far been decided. No announcements have yet been made on if, when or how school 
choice will be practiced in the future, other than the possibility of a later removal. The 
timing makes this thesis increasingly relevant, as both sides emphasize what these 
changes could mean in terms of student performance and dropout rates. Despite bold 
claims and fierce accusations, little research is available on the long-term consequences 
of the reform. As they prepare for another change, policy makers should have an interest 






The purpose of this thesis is to examine to what extent competition for school admission 
can be linked to dropout rates. Motivated by existing literature, I aim to connect the 
research on gender differences and school choice and apply it to the case of a reform 
implemented in Hordaland in 2005 which introduced the ability to choose which high 
school to attend. The basis for this angle is part lack of research on the topic, and part 
availability of data. There are other measurable outcomes that warrants equal interest, 
but are not as readily available as dropout rates. Test scores, grades, choice of high 
school track, rates of higher education and early labor market outcomes are a few 
examples of what could be expanded on in further research. To perform the analysis 
I’ve obtained data from Statistics Norway’s ‘Statistical Bank’, which provides detailed 
statistics on dropout rates, divided by county, gender and high school study program. 
The rates are linked to individual register data from their National Database for 
Education, but only available publicly in aggregated form. I have limited the analysis to 
students in the 19 mainland counties, meaning that data from Svalbard or students 
abroad is disregarded. The period of focus is 2000-2010, in which the Hordaland reform 
takes place midway, making it a suitable case for study. In this chapter I summarize the 
statistics that the analysis is built on and provide descriptive data from the sample.  
 
4.1 Dropout rates 
By ‘dropout’ Statistics Norway refer to an individual who have failed to complete their 
upper secondary education within five years of their initial enrollment, at which point 
the statutory right to schooling expires. The data is collected for all students registered 
at a Norwegian high school, including all teaching institutions that satisfies the 
conditions of the Education Act, meaning both private and public schools are included 
in the rates. In my sample, observations are aggregated at the county level, and 
expressed as percentages of the total enrollment for each cohort. Statistics Norway 
define these cohorts in five-year interval, where for example 2000-05 refers to dropouts 
among those starting high school for the first time in 2000. For simplicity, they are 
usually referred to by their starting year. This means that the 2010-cohort extends to 




Table 1 details dropout rates in the sample. The dataset is split between genders and 
study program, in addition to the total for the cohort in question. The 12 study programs 
offered to high school students are divided in ‘general’ and ‘vocational’ categories20. 
The average for the period is a dropout rate of 18 %, revealing a high school completion 
rate lower than the OECD average (OECD, 2016a). There is however a downwards 
trend in the overall dropout rates, as the total decreases from 18.9 to 15.2 % from the 
2000 to the 2010 cohort. This reduction is present for all genders and study programs. 
Hordaland see a similar trend in the overall dropout rate, but have somewhat 
heterogeneous developments between the different groups, which form the basis for this 
analysis. We also note the large discrepancy between the academic track students and 
vocational track students, where the former has an average dropout rate of 6.9 while the 
latter is closer to 30 %. In the most severe cases, dropout rates among VSP-students is 
approaching 50 %21. In addition, we can clearly see the gender gap emerging from the 
table. Boys have a higher dropout rate in every category, in all counties. Although girls 
complete their schooling at higher rates than boys do, we note that the difference 
between the different study tracks is generally larger than the gender gap. The lowest 
amount of dropouts is observed in Oslo in 2008, coincidently a county with one of the 
lowest shares of students in vocational programs. For contrast, the highest rate is found 
among male VSP-students in Finnmark in 2003 54.9 %22.  
  Table 1 - Dropout rates 2000-2010 











GSP 6.9 2.2 2.4 15.9 











GSP 8.5 2.9 2.6 19.5 











GSP 5.6 1.9 2.0 13.0 
VSP 24.1 4.4 16.7 39.3 
   Note: GSP: General study programs   VSP: Vocational study programs 
                                                 
20 For more detailed statistics of each specific programs refer to the Education Mirror for 2016 
(Norwegian Directory for Education and Training, 2017) 
21 Recently some criticism has been given to Statistics Norway definition of ‘dropout’ from Vogt (2017). 
He argues that their 5-year window is biased against vocational study programs, as these students might 
not finish their education until their late 20s, yet are still counted as a dropout in the official statistics. 
This might exaggerate the ‘dropout problem’, even though the completion rate has been relatively stable 
the last 20 years according to Vogt. 
22 Note however that this is a far less populated county than the others, which means that the limited data 
might skew and exacerbate the numbers. 
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Overall, there are not large differences between counties offering school choice and 
those who do not in the period 2000-2010. Table 2 shows averages for the same nine 
categories, and reveals that dropout rates are almost identical for several of them23.  
There is only a slight trend towards lower dropout rates in PP-counties, and less 
variability between these.  
Table 2 - Comparing dropout rates between FSC- and PP-counties 
  Mean SD Min. Max. 
FSC-COUNTIES ALL STUDENTS     
 Total 19.0 5.4 11.7 31.5 
 GSP 7.6 3.1 2.4 15.9 











 GSP 9.7 3.9 2.6 19.5 











 GSP 5.9 2.8 2 13 
 VSP 25.1 5.6 16.7 39.3 
PP-COUNTIES ALL STUDENTS     
 Total 18.7 2.6 13.5 23.5 
 GSP 6.8 1.7 3.1 11.7 











 GSP 8.2 2.2 3.6 13.7 











 GSP 5.6 1.4 2.2 9.8 
 VSP 24.9 3.9 17.2 36.3 
Note: FSC: Counties where school choice is employed   PP: Counties using the proximity principle 
 
4.2 Background characteristics 
Table 3 lists descriptive data on background characteristics for the counties in the 
sample, where Hordaland is compared to the national average. Population refers to the 
number of inhabitants within a given county, measured yearly. For ‘National’, the 
population count is the average of all counties. Median income measures the yearly, 
individual income that splits the income distribution in halves. The income data is 
collected by Statistics Norway from the annual tax returns, and is reported in 
Norwegian kroner in nominal terms. Also included is statistics on the level of education. 
Here, the categories refers to the percentage of the population for whom this is the 
                                                 
23 Switching counties are excluded from this table 
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highest level of completed schooling. ‘Compulsory’ refers to the 10-year primary and 
lower secondary education, while ‘High school’ refers to completion of the voluntary 
upper secondary education. University education is split, where a ‘short education’ is 
defined as four years or less, while a ‘long education’ is five years and above.   
 
Table 3 - Background characteristics 
 Mean SD Min. Max. 
HORDALAND     
Population 448852 11433 435219 469681 
Median income 256191 41139 200400 318200 
Compulsory 29.5 1.5 27.2 32.1 
High School 44.6 0.8 43.5 45.5 
Short University 19.9 1.4 17.8 21.8 
Long University 6.0 0.9 4.8 7.4 
NATIONAL     
Population 242631 962917 72399 575475 
Median income 248899 39907 179000 346500 
Compulsory 32.6 4.1 22 42.4 
High School 44.3 3.7 33.3 49.6 
Short University 18.3 3.0 13.5 29 
Long University 4.8 2.5 2.4 15.7 
 
In terms of most of these variables, Hordaland is almost remarkably average. The most 
apparent discrepancy is that Hordaland is a large, populous county by Norwegian 
standards, with the third highest population throughout the period. Bergen might 
account for a somewhat higher median income, and a higher degree of inhabitants with 
a university education than the national average24. Both Hordaland and Norway in 
general see a general trend of increased attainment of tertiary education. In 2010, almost 
30 % of inhabitants in both Hordaland and Norway overall have some sort of University 
schooling. 
 
Do counties with school choice differ from other counties? Table 4 details averages for 
the FSC-counties and compares them to PP-counties on the same variables as Table 3. 
No striking difference is apparent. FSC-counties have a slightly higher income and 
cover a greater range of sizes, while PP-counties have a higher population on average. 
In regards to education, no trend is detectable, as there appears to be no systematic 
difference between the two groups. In lower end of the panel we see that the four 
                                                 
24 McHenry (2014) discuss how college educated workers are both more mobile, and more aggressive in 
seeking out job markets with higher wages. A result of this is the sorting of high-skills workers into urban 
areas which can sustain a more comprehensive job market, and where returns to education are higher. 
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counties, excluding Hordaland, that changed systems in the 00’s (hereby referred to as 
‘the switchers’) are on average larger than those who did not25. In addition, income is 
higher, as well as the rate of university graduates, which is not surprising considering 
that the switchers contain several of the largest metropolitan areas in Norway (such as 
Hordaland, Akershus and Oslo). From Table 3 we see that Hordaland is relatively equal, 
although on the lower side of the average. The discrepancies are not striking, however, 
and supports the notion that the population in the different counties are relatively 
homogenous. This claim is in line with Guneriussen (2012) and Brugård (2013) who 
argue that school choice in Norway is more of an ideological issue than an evidence-
based one. Which counties offer school choice is thus a question of politics, and hard to 
predict ex ante based on characteristics.    
 
Table 4 – Comparing characteristics between FSC-, PP- and switching counties 
 Mean SD Min. Max. 
FSC-COUNTIES     
Population 179568 119398 72399 420574 
Median income 246622 38956 183700 331500 
Compulsory 32.6 4.0 28.2 42.4 
High School 45.4 3.4 38.7 49.6 
Short University 18.0 1.5 14.8 20.8 
Long University 4.0 0.9 2.6 6.8 
PP-COUNTIES     
Population 200987 49978 127108 286729 
Median income 242125 37086 179000 312700 
Compulsory 34.2 3.4 27.1 41 
High School 44.5 2.2 40.1 48.6 
Short University 17.2 1.9 13.6 21.4 
Long University 4.2 1.4 2.4 8.7 
THE SWITCHERS 
    
Population 363603 154217 182701 575475 
Median income 263682 44418 183100 346500 
Compulsory 30.0 4.8 22 38 
High School 42.6 4.5 33.3 47.2 
Short University 20.5 4.9 13.5 29 
Long University 6.9 4.3 2.4 15.7 
 
 
4.3 Composition of student mass 
Different groups of students complete their schooling at varying rates. In addition to 
boys dropping out more than girls, and VSP-students more than GSP-students, Statistics 
Norway report that students with a minority background are less likely to graduate from 
                                                 
25 Other than Hordaland in 2005, Akershus (2003), Oppland (2003) and Møre og Romsdal (2001) 
switched to school choice systems during the 00’s. In addition, Oslo changed to PP in 2005 and back to 
FSC in 2008 
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high school within the normal time frame (Statistics Norway, 2016a). As such, the 
composition of the student mass can have a significant impact on the amount of 
dropouts in a given county. Table 5 lists the distribution of girls and boys, students in 
the different high school tracks and share of minority students.  
Table 5 - Distribution of gender, study program and minorities 
 Mean SD Min. Max 
HORDALAND     
Girls 50.1 1.1 48.4 52.2 
Boys 49.9 1.1 47.8 51.6 
GSP Share 55.3 3.2 50.8 59.4 
VSP Share 44.7 3.2 40.6 49.2 
Minority Share 5.9 1.0 4.3 7.1 
NATIONAL     
Girls 50.4 1.4 46.5 54.4 
Boys 49.6 1.4 45.6 53.5 
GSP Share 53.9 5.5 43.0 72.7 
VSP Share 46.4 5.5 27.3 57.0 
Minority Share 7.8 6.1 1.8 35.3 
   Note: Statistics Norway define both immigrants and children of immigrants (so-called second-generation 
             minorities) as students with a minority background 
 
The genders are on average split almost 50/50 both in Hordaland and in Norway in 
general. Although there are some fluctuations around the time of the reform, the same 
trend appears nationally, and it is hard to tell whether this is a random variation or not. 
The share of students with a minority background is lower in Hordaland than the 
national average. This is partly explained by Oslo where the share is about 30 %, almost 
triple that of any other county. If we disregard this and Akershus county, minority 
students are evenly distributed among the counties, with Hordaland on an average level. 
The distribution of students in GSPs and VSPs is similar, but changes after 2005. 
 
4.4 Shortcomings 
As with any empirical analysis, this thesis is at the mercy of the quality of the data. 
Although Statistics Norway provide a rich variety of available data, there are some 
issues that could diminish the robustness of the analysis. Foremost is the level at which 
the data is aggregated. Ideally, I would have access to the individual register data, which 
would allow me to track specific cohorts before and after the reform. It would also 
allow for a richer set of controls on individual characteristics, which could increase the 
precision of the estimates. The covariates included in the analysis try to emulate the 
same effect, but are inherently sub-optimal for a comprehensive analysis. When data is 
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aggregated at the county level it also reduces the possibility of clustering standard 
errors. Since Norway consists of 19 counties this is also the number of clusters 
available. In some cases this could be too few to achieve adequate precision of the error 
terms26. Ideally we might have wanted to cluster at the municipality level, which in this 
case is not possible. 
 
As data on the necessary variables have not been available below the county level, the 
possibility to study effects within each county is also excluded. It would be interesting, 
however, to do similar analyses on variations at lower levels, for example within 
different municipalities, or even city districts. Lindbom and Almgren (2007) emphasize 
the heterogeneity of the school choice effect between different neighborhoods, while 
Lødding and Helland (2007) find that downtown high schools are more vulnerable to 
the admission system than suburban schools. It is very plausible that the effect of school 
choice is different in rural areas than, say, Oslo and Bergen city center. More detailed 
geographical data would also allow me to explore the role of commute distances, linked 
to which students is doing the commuting, as a possible mechanism of increased 
dropouts. Unfortunately, this, in addition to data on dropout rates for individual schools 
or neighborhoods, have not been publicly available to access for a Master’s student.   
  
                                                 
26 The potential pitfall of too few clusters is further addressed in Chapter 5.2.1. 
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5 Research design 
 
My main analysis uses a difference-in-differences approach (DID). Its’ popularity 
among empirical scholars have surged in the last decades, partly following in the wake 
of the seminal paper from Card and Krueger (1994). Their analysis of a minimum wage 
hike in New Jersey demonstrated how exogenous policy changes could be exploited as a 
quasi-experiment, allowing researchers to estimate reform effects. This thesis utilize this 
substantial body of work, and employs a similar identification strategy. Below, I detail 
the theoretical foundation for DID-estimation and how it applies to the Hordaland-case.  
 
5.1 The identification problem 
Reform analysis aims to estimate the effect of treatment on specific groups. A typical 
research design involves applying such treatment to one group, and comparing the 
results to a non-treated control group, identifying the difference in outcomes as the 
treatment effect. However, if covariates that affect the dependent variable of interest 
also affect whether an observation is placed in the control or the treatment group it 
could have consequences for the results on which we base our conclusions, as we could 
have a selection bias problem27. An obvious example in this case is comparing dropout 
rates between students in public and private schools. If the aim is to measure the 
benefits of attending a private institution it would be hazardous to simply compare 
students in public and private schools as Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) and Lødding and 
Helland (2007) show that these are not necessarily similar groups of students. In many 
cases, students in private schools stem from backgrounds of higher socio-economic 
status, and is thus expected to perform better than other students, regardless of 
institution. By attributing their academic performance to the private school, without 
controlling for background characteristics, the effect of private schooling might be 
skewed upwards if those attending private school already have better abilities than their 
counterparts, and thus would perform better in any setting. A randomized trial 
eliminates such bias by randomly assigning treatment status in the sample, thus isolating 
the effect by ensuring that all other variables and characteristics are randomly and 
                                                 
27 James Heckman has provided comprehensive work on how to detect and abate selection bias in 
econometric studies. Notable contributions include Heckman (1979) and Heckman (1990). Demaris 
(2014) provides a practical overview on how Heckman’s selection models can combat unmeasured 
confounding, which he describes as the ‘principal threat’ to unbiased estimation of treatment effects.  
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independently distributed between the two groups. Unfortunately for the econometrician 
random trials are seldom available, both because of the nature of the research topics 
studied, as well as the scope necessary for such a randomized trial in the school sector. 
Economic studies often rely on observable data, for which selection and confounding is 
hard to mitigate a priori. This is also the case for this study, where the conclusions 
hinges on the assumption that the control group chosen is an adequate approximation of 
what we would observe in the treatment group had they gone untreated.  
 
A popular second-best solution among social scientists is relying on so-called natural 
experiments, in which exogenous changes in policy can be exploited as a quasi-random 
trial with an identifiable treatment effect. Difference-in-differences is a relevant strategy 
for such a case, assuming that the policy change only affects a sub-set of our 
observations, or at least not all at the same time. Assuming further that the assignment 
of treatment is (quasi) random, so that there are no systematic process determining 
which counties implement school choice at which time (treatment status appears ‘as if’ 
random), a suitable non-treated control group allow for the identification of effects. 
Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan (2016) discuss the advantages and challenges of the 
popularity of such natural experiments in economic research28. They argue that even 
though studies of this kind have been instrumental in developing compelling evidence 
for many economic hypotheses with policy implications, it is not without faults. “The 
fundamental challenge” they write, “is to argue that the historical episode in question 
provides the quasi-random variation that is necessary to identify causal effects” (Fuchs-
Schündeln and Hassan, 2016 p. 991). To substantiate such an argument, they underscore 
the need for corroborative evidence and supporting analysis, especially to mitigate 
concerns regarding the identifying assumptions. Bertrand et al. (2004) questions how 
much faith we can put in DID-estimates. Their main concern is that such analyses often 
fail to address inconsistencies in the estimation of standard errors, leading to false 
significance in the results. To address the issue they stress the need for placebo and 
robustness testing of both estimates and error terms in order to increase inferential 
validity. Both concerns are noted and addressed in Chapters 6 and 7.   
                                                 
28 They define a natural experiment as “historical episodes that provide observable, quasi-random 
variation in treatment subject to a plausible identifying assumption” (Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan, 2016 
p. 925). The policy change in Hordaland in 2005 fit this description reasonably well.  
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5.2 The difference-in-differences method 
Consider an outcome Yict, observed for student group i, in county c, at time t. In this 
case the outcome corresponds to dropout rates for the given group and t = year. 
Treatment status is assigned with the dummy D, with school choice being the treatment 
in question.  
𝐷𝑐 = {0,1} 
→ 𝑌0𝑐 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑐 | 𝐷 = 0 
→ 𝑌1𝑐 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑐 | 𝐷 = 1 
All units could potentially get treatment, but we can only observe them in one state after 
the treatment has occurred. This implies that Y0c gives the outcome for county c if not 
treated and Y1c is the outcome if treated. We are also interested in the unobserved, 
counterfactual outcomes. Behind every Y1c there is a potential Y0c that is not realized. 
Comparing dropout rates in Hordaland before and after the reform is not sufficient. The 
causal effect lies in the difference between the observable outcomes after treatment, and 
outcomes that would have been observed had treatment not occurred. The equation of 
interest is therefore 
                                       𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑌1𝑖𝑐𝑡|𝐷𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌1𝑖𝑐𝑡|𝐷𝑖 = 0)                     ( 1 ) 
which is obviously impossible, since an observation cannot be treated and at the same 
time not treated. A proxy is needed for the counterfactual outcome. Using DID, finding 
such a proxy consists of identifying a comparable control group to the treated. Ideally, 
this control group will have a similar distribution of characteristics, so that 
𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑐𝑡 | 𝑿𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝐷𝑐𝑡 , 𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑐𝑡 | 𝑿𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝑡)                             (2) 
implying that treatment status is random, conditional on other covariates (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008). Finding a suitable proxy is a key task of any empirical study aiming to 
use DID. Geographical variations is a popular choice, and the strategy of this thesis’ 
analysis29. Generally, we want to compare the treatment group to those who display a 
similar trend ex ante, but do not receive treatment so that we can estimate (3): 
𝐷𝐼𝐷 = 𝐸(𝑌1𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌1𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑟𝑒|𝐷𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌0𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑟𝑒|𝐷𝑖 = 0)      ( 3 ) 
                                                 
29 This strategy was also used by Card and Krueger (1994), who compared the labor market in New 
Jersey with neighbor state Pennsylvania which did not increase the minimum wage.  
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This equation measures the difference between pre-treatment and post-treatment 
observations for both groups. The difference between these two differences is the effect 
we are looking for.  
 
The identifying assumption in this approach is that of a ‘parallel trend’. In the absence 
of treatment, the DID-framework assumes that  
𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑐𝑡  | 𝑐, 𝑡) = 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜆𝑡                                                          (4) 
meaning that the observed outcome is a sum of county specific trends and year effects 
present among all observations. This implies that the potential outcome of a cohort 
should be unrelated to the timing of the policy change. Without intervention, the trends 
should be equal between the treated and the control, though not necessarily in levels.  
𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌0𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑟𝑒|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌0𝑖𝑐,𝑝𝑟𝑒|𝐷𝑖 = 0)          (5) 
If treatment has effect, Hordaland will deviate from these trends compared to the control 
group. To identify such an effect, equation (6) is estimated. 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑐 + 𝜆𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖𝑐𝑡                        (6) 
In this equation D is treatment status, Post = 1 in periods after the reform, with the 
interaction being the DID-estimator. However, as this estimator only makes the 
distinction between pre- and post-treatment periods, limited control for overall time 
trends common for all observations is achieved. When data is available for several 
periods both before and after, a vector of dummies for each period of time such trends 
are controlled, leading to more precise estimates of treatment effects. Additionally, one 
might include a vector of county specific dummies, whose inclusion control for mean 
differences in dropout rates between counties. In such cases, the estimated equation is  
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑐 + ∑ 𝜆𝑡𝑇
𝑇
𝑡=1 + 𝛿𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑐𝐶
𝐶
𝑐=1 + 𝑖𝑐𝑡             (7) 
where C and T are the vectors for county and year dummies30. In some cases an 
interaction between the two is employed as well, in addition to additional controls for 
covariates who vary between counties and over time. Several specifications are tested 
and reported.    
                                                 
30 This specification is inspired by the one used in Autor (2003). 
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5.3 Issues with standard errors 
An important criterion for our confidence in the regression estimates is correct treatment 
of the standard errors. While the implementation of heteroskedastic-robust errors is 
almost routine in modern statistical software, they can be “misleading when the 
asymptotic approximation that justifies these estimates are not very good” (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008 p. 293)31. In basic cross-sectional analysis we assume that observations 
represent a random draw from a population, and that they are independent from other 
observations. However, this will often not be the case, and failure to correct for bias 
represents a threat to the validity of the inference. Angrist and Pischke (2008) note that 
the most important form of such correlation arises in the presence of grouping in the 
data. An example in this case is the dropout rate observed within each county. Since 
different cohorts of students are exposed to the same environmental inputs we might 
expect their observed outcomes to be correlated. Another common issue is serial-
correlation in observations. When employing time series, an observation one year will 
often correlate with observation the year before or after. This is especially the case 
when operating in a DID-framework where the dummy variables are obvious examples 
of strong serial correlation. As such, researchers should take measures to prevent 
potential bias in their estimations. Below I detail two approaches to correct issues of the 
error terms, both of which are included in the robustness tests in Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.1 Clustering errors 
Autor (2003) provides an example of how grouping of observations might affect a DID-
analysis. In his use of data from each state in the US it will be reasonable to suspect that 
the error term within each state is not independent, but could be serial correlated. If 
there is correlation within each category, but independent between them it can be wise 
to correct by clustering standard errors32. Cameron and Miller (2015) note that failure to 
cluster could lead normal OLS to overestimate the precision of the estimates, and 
underestimate standard errors33. In their illustration of the problem they consider the 
simple OLS case with one regressor (while assuming α = 0 for simplicity) 
                                                 
31 Angrist and Pischke do however note that robust standard errors improve the performance of estimators 
as they are asymptotically valid in the case of heteroscedastic errors, which is common in the practical 
implementation of regression models.  
32 The importance of addressing clustering in a DID-framework is also stressed in Bertrand et. al (2004). 
33 For more in-depth mathematical presentations of the cluster-robust standard error solution, refer to 
Cameron and Miller (2015), Cameron et. al. (2008), or White (1984). 
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𝑦𝑐 = 𝛽𝑥𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐, 𝑐 = 1…𝑁                                         (8) 
Under the normal Gauss-Markov conditions for linear regression we assume that  
E[uc] = 0. If so is the case, the OLS estimator ?̂? can be expressed as ∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑦𝑐/∑ 𝑥𝑐
2
𝑐𝑐 . 
The residual of the estimate is then ?̂? − 𝛽 = ∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑐/∑ 𝑥𝑐
2
𝑐𝑐 . This implies that the 
variance of ?̂? is equal to the expected value of the squared residual. 
𝑉(?̂?) = 𝐸 [(?̂? − 𝛽)
2
] = 𝑉[∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑐]/[∑ 𝑥𝑐
2]𝑐
2
𝑐                           (9) 
 In the case of uncorrelated error terms between counties, 𝑉[∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑐] = ∑ 𝑥𝑐
2𝑉[𝑢𝑐]𝑐𝑐 . 
Assuming further that the errors are homoscedastic, so that V[uc] =  σ
2, we get the 





.  If, however, errors are correlated, we 
get bias in the variance estimates. Assume we have observations c and c’. In the 
correlating case, the variance for c will be given by 
𝑉[𝛴𝑐𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑐] = 𝛴𝑐𝛴𝑐′𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑐 , 𝑥𝑐′𝑢𝑐′] = 𝛴𝑐𝛴𝑐′𝑥𝑐𝑥𝑐′𝐸[𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑐′] 
                       
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→      𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑟(?̂?) = [∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑥𝑐′𝐸[𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑐′]]𝑐′𝑐 /[∑ 𝑥𝑐
2]𝑐
2
                             (10) 
For clustered errors, a rewrite of (10) can be useful. We assume that 𝐸[𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑐′] = 0, 
unless c and c’ belong in the same cluster. Hence, we write (10) as  
𝑉𝑐𝑙𝑢(?̂?) = [∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑥𝑐′𝐸[𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑐′]𝑐′𝑐  | (𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐
′𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟)]/ [∑ 𝑥𝑐
2]𝑐
2
  (11) 
We will typically find that 𝑉𝑐𝑙𝑢(?̂?) > 𝑉(?̂?) as un-clustered errors tends to have a 
downwards bias (Cameron and Miller, 2015 p. 321). A critical consequence is the 
tendency to over-reject null-hypotheses under a normal t-distribution test for 
significance when we fail to address within-cluster correlation34. By estimating (11) 
rather than (9) we obtain cluster-robust (and heteroscedastic-robust) standard errors. 
Cameron and Miller suggest clustering on the level at which you believe the 
observations to be independent, which suggests that time units are unfitting. In the case 
of this thesis, clustering at the county level seems natural. Chapter 4 demonstrates how 
there are some general differences in dropout rates between counties, which could 
suggest that the dropout rate for different cohorts within the same county is correlated. 
There is however little to suggest that error terms are correlated between counties.  
                                                 
34 In a t-test, the critical value for rejection of a null-hypothesis at the 5 % significance level is typically 
?̂? ± 1.96 𝑥 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟, which underscores the importance of obtaining precise error terms.  
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A second concern when clustering errors is the number of clusters. Cameron and Miller 
proclaim that “more is always better” to ensure that the asymptotic properties are 
realized, and that there are no definitive answers on how few is too few. A problem is 
the tendency of OLS-estimators to ‘over-fit’ data when using too few clusters, with 
narrow confidence intervals and over-rejection of null-hypotheses as a consequence. 
Angrist and Pischke (2008) note that this can be a result of the serial correlated shocks 
being underestimated, meaning that inference on estimated coefficients is problematic. 
Consider the standard Wald t-statistic 𝑤 =
?̂?−𝛽
𝑠?̂?
 where 𝑠?̂? is the square root of VClu (?̂?) 
from (11). Assuming there are G clusters, 𝑤 ~ 𝑁(0,1) only when 𝐺 → ∞. In the case of 
low G, asymptotics are not yet realized, which could mean that the variance has a 
downwards bias (Cameron and Miller, 2015 p. 340). The current consensus of 50 
clusters for the typical state-year panel data of DID-analyses have been shown to 
perform reasonably well, but the results become more unclear as the clusters decrease 
towards zero. Bertrand et. al (2004) and Cameron et. al (2008) show that tendencies of 
over-rejection appear when clusters drop below 30, and increases for lower numbers of 
clusters. There are however no ‘cut-off’ at which the number of clusters become too 
low, and Cameron and Miller stress that it must be considered on a model-to-model 
basis. Hence, there is not necessarily a problem of using 19 clusters, as is the case of 
this thesis, but that researchers should be aware of the potential pitfall.  
 
5.3.2 Bootstrapping 
The standard parametric assumptions of statistical inference postulate that a sample 
drawn from a population follows a known probability distribution. By repeatedly 
drawing samples from the same population, the parametric model assumes that the 
statistic of interest, like the coefficient, will be the same every time. However, since the 
sample will vary with each draw, so will the statistic, giving rise to the sampling 
distribution. In cases where the assumptions about the sampling distribution is 
questionable, for example when errors are not normally distributed, a bootstrapping 
procedure might improve performance of the estimator.  
 
The aim is to simulate the possible randomness underlying the observations. In a basic 
regression model the only random element is the error term, which is often the basis for 
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such bootstrapping.  In practical terms, consider our sample N. In a bootstrap we treat N 
as the population and repeatedly draw from it (with replacement), constructing a 
sampling distribution in the process. Angrist and Pischke (2008) note that, intuitively, 
this provides a reasonable approximation of the distribution we’re after. Using this 
approximation we can estimate the properties of an estimator, like its variance. Because 
the true population is unknown, the true error term of the sample is uncertain. However, 
when we treat N as the population, the ‘true’ error is measurable because the population 
is known. This means that we approximate the standard error of the true distribution 
with the errors of the re-estimates of the fitted model. Thus we can assess the quality of 
our inference on the resampled data. It’s validity for the true population is conditional 
on the sampling distribution obtained from resampling N being a reasonable 
approximation. If implemented correctly, bootstrapping can therefore improve 
inference, for example by reducing bias in the normal, robust standard errors. Adèr et al. 
(2008) suggests that bootstrapping can be especially useful when the sample size is 
small, which we might suspect could be the case here. In Chapter 6 I employ what is 
commonly known as a non-parametric bootstrap, where you repeatedly draw pairs of 
the dependent variable and the regressor from N, with results posted in Table 9.  
 
5.4 The synthetic control method 
If adequate control groups are not available, a synthetic one might be constructed. This 
method was pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) who questioned the 
suitability of more or less arbitrary control groups as the proxy for the counterfactuals 
of the treated. They proposed an approach where instead a usable control is designed 
based on a ‘data-driven selection procedure’35. By employing a weighted average of 
observable control units, a hypothetical group is constructed to best approximate the 
treatment group in the period before treatment occurs. The control variables utilized are 
chosen based on their relative similarity to the treatment group, and relevance for 
determining pre-treatment outcomes. When implemented correctly, the authors argue 
that such a synthetic group can achieve a better extrapolation of counterfactual 
outcomes than observed groups of untreated.  
                                                 
35 The design of the method, as well as its practical application for statistical software, is further discussed 




In the case of the Hordaland reform we observe c = 1,…,19 counties in the period 2000-
2010. For ease of notation, refer to the time periods as t = 1,…,T and assume that 
Hordaland = c = 1. Treatment is introduced at time period T0+1, so that we have 
1,2,…,T0  periods to construct the synthetic group from, and T0+1, T0+2,…,T post-
treatment periods. Define Uc as a vector of the observed characteristics for each 
county36. In addition, the vector K = (k1,…,kT0)’ contains linear combinations of 
outcomes in the years 2000-2004, so that ?̅?𝑐
𝐾 = 𝛴𝑠=1
𝑇0 𝑘𝑠𝑌𝑐𝑠, where s refers to pre-
treatment time periods. Assume we use M pre-treatment outcomes, where M ≤ T0
37
. 
With these controls, j = 2,…,19 donor counties, and s = 1,2,…T0 pre-treatment periods, 
a synthetic control group can be constructed. The process consists of choosing a vector 
of weights, W = (w2,…,w19)’ where wc ≥ 0 for all donor counties so that 𝛴𝑐=2
19 𝑤𝑐 = 1. 
Obviously, there are many combinations of weights that satisfies this condition. The 
objective of the method is hence to choose the ideal set of weights W* that is the best 
approximation of the treated group. To achieve this, combine the characteristics of 
Hordaland in a (k x 1) matrix 𝑋1 = (𝑈1′, ?̅?1
𝐾1 , … , ?̅?1
𝐾𝑀)′, and those of the control units in 
a (k x 18) matrix, where for the c-th row 𝑋0 = (𝑈𝑐′, ?̅?𝑐
𝐾1 , … , ?̅?𝑐
𝐾𝑀)′. The optimal 
synthetic control is then that whose vector W* minimizes the difference between the 
treated and the control, formally expressed as ‖𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊‖. To minimize the mean 
square error, optimal weights is obtained by solving 
‖𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊‖𝑉 = √(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)′𝑉(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)                             (11) 
In (11), V refers to a (k x k) matrix containing different weights for the variables in X1 
and X0, where the optimal choice of V identifies W*
38. The resulting synthetic group is 
the optimal combination of covariates and pre-treatment outcomes within the limits of 
the available data. By doing so, the initial equation of interest, (1), can be rewritten to 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =̂ (𝑌1𝑡|𝐷𝑖 = 1) − (𝛴𝑐=2
18 𝑤𝑐
∗𝑌𝑐𝑡|𝐷𝑖 = 0)                            (12) 
 
                                                 
36 Refer to Chapter 4 for details. 
37 Adding such outcomes is similar to controlling for county specific effects in section 5.2 
38 A suggested procedure for choosing the optimal V*, which is implemented as default in Stata, is 
described in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and Abadie et. al (2010). 
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In my analysis, I construct a hypothetical Hordaland based on the covariates described 
in Chapter 4. Using background characteristics from PP-counties, as well as the 
composition of the student mass I design a control group for each of the four students 
group on which the focus of my analysis lay. This includes median income, the share of 
minority students, the share of vocational students, the share in private schools and the 
level of education in the population. All of these can be assumed to be predictors of the 
dropout rate in a given county, which makes them suitable variables for this method. 
The observed dropout rates from the last three years leading up to the reform is also 
included for increased precision. Table 6 reports the estimated values for the covariates 
of the synthetic group and compare them to Hordaland39. It appears as the synthetic 
GSP-groups provide better approximations than the VSP-counterparts, although both 
are reasonably close to the factual treated group. When comparing the pre-treatment 
dropout rates, which differed quite a lot for VSPs, we see from the final three rows that 
the estimated dropouts for the synthetic VSPs are closer to treated ones. They are 
however not perfect, with a divergence of several percent appearing closer to the year of 
the reform. For GSPs, the dropout rates are better fitted, and almost identical for the 
girls. Two covariates distinguish themselves as explanatory variables for which 
Hordaland differs from other counties. In Row 2 and 4 we see that no comparable 
donors are found for the share of minority students or the share of students in private 
school. For the former, Hordaland stands out with an unusually low rate compared to 
other counties, while for the latter we see that private schools holds a significantly 
larger share of the educational market. Similar discrepancies were found using the full 
sample. If these are crucial determinants of dropout rates this could be cause for concern 
for the validity of the results. On the other hand, the fit of pre-treatment trends, at least 
for GSPs, is encouraging.
                                                 
39 The practical implementation of the method was achieved by using the Synth Stata-package created by 
Abadie et. al (2011). 
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Table 6: The suitability of the synthetic control group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Donors:  
PP-counties 
Boys GSP Boys VSP Girls GSP Girls VSP 
 Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic 
Median income 225775 220400 225775 206981 
 
225775 220090 225775 225427 









5.7 4.8 6.2 4.8 6.7 






51.4 46.8 47.2 46.8 46.8 
 





































       










45.3 45.0 45.3 44.0 
       
Share with short 
College education 
18.8 17.6 18.8 16.7 18.8 17.7 18.8 17.4 
       
Share with long 
College education 
5.4 5.4 5.4 3.4 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.3 
       
Dropouts (2004) 
 
7.5 7.9 23.9 29.5 5.2 5.2 22 23.9 
Dropouts (2003) 
 
8.9 8.5 25.8 29.3 4.7 4.7 19.9 22.2 
Dropouts (2002) 8.6 9.0 26.3 27.9 5 5.3 21.4 21.5 
                           Note: A comparison between the factual data for Hordaland, and the estimated data for the synthetic control utilized.  





This chapter discusses the results from the regression analysis described in chapter 5. 
First I explore the assumption of parallel trends by looking at the graphical evidence. I 
then discuss how the trends in dropout rates in Hordaland changed noticeably from 
other counties in the years following the reform. Regression results from the difference-
in-differences estimation follow in section 6.2. To validate, I put these results through a 
series of robustness tests. This includes exploring the possibility of placebo effects, as 
well as the timing of trend deviations. Lastly, I discuss whether the results from 
Hordaland can be applicable in a general context. 
 
6.1 The suitability of the control groups 
The identification of causal effects in comparative analyses like DID hinges on the 
comparability of the control group. When using quasi-random natural experiments, the 
critical assumption is that of a parallel trend between the treated and the control in the 
periods leading up to the treatment (expressed in equation (5) above). If this condition is 
not satisfied, our assertion that the control group provides an adequate proxy for the 
unobserved counterfactual of the treated is at best questionable. In the analysis I employ 
three different controls, with an increasing level of precision. The first is comparing 
Hordaland to the national trend, using the full data sample as the control group. This 
includes both counties with and without school choice systems, in addition to the 
switchers. As the discussion in Chapter 4 illustrated, Hordaland is similar to national 
averages on many of the covariates which we can assume are predictive of dropout 
rates. However, using this specification we assume that there is an overall national 
trend, common among all counties, from which Hordaland deviates in the case of 
treatment effects. A better approach might be comparing Hordaland to those who 
continue using the proximity principle throughout the entire period (the PP-counties). 
As these counties never receive treatment, a deviation in trend post-2005 could identify 
effects on Hordaland. The third control employed is the synthetic method detailed in 
Chapter 5. This might represent the best fitted pre-treatment trends, but comes with 
other complications, which are discussed in 6.2. To explore the common trend 
assumption, graphical analysis is typically used (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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6.1.1 Graphical analysis of dropout trends 
Throughout the 2000’s, dropout rates were declining. Figure 3, Panel A shows a 
positive development for both Hordaland and Norway as a whole. However, we note 
that the dropout rate in Hordaland peaks in 2005 at the implementation of the reform, 
deviating from the overall trend. Keep in mind that the dropout rate of this cohort is 
measured in 2010, meaning that the peak occurs for the first batch of students starting 
their high school education after the reform is in effect. While the national rate exceeds 
Hordaland for the entire period, they converge towards the end, with the difference 
between them halved in the span of ten years.  
 
In Panel B I illustrate the difference between GSP- and VSP-students. As expected, 
VSP-students drop out at a far higher rate than their counterparts. In Hordaland, both 
groups drop out less than the national rate at the start of the period. Contrary to the rest 
of the country though, there is a sharp increase in dropouts among students in the 
academic track after 2005, with a corresponding decrease among students in vocational 
tracks. The VSP-rate actually peaks in 2005, but then declines steadily in the following 
years. These results are interesting as it could indicate that the different groups respond 
differently to increased choice. The increase in dropouts among GSP-students is 
striking, and seem to be the driving factor behind the spike in the overall rates.  
 
The trend is more pronounced when separating the genders (Panel C). In Hordaland, 
both boys and girls in academic track education see an increase in dropouts after the 
reform. The effect is demonstrably larger for boys though, where the rate increases from 
6.7 to 10.7 % from the 2005 to the 2006 cohort, and peaks in 2007 at 13.4 %. In other 
words, two years removed from the reform we observe a dropout rate almost double that 
from prior cohorts. The effect on girls is strong as well, though less substantial than for 
boys. From 2005 to the peak in 2008, the dropout rate for female GSP-students increase 
from 6 to 7.7 %, though the increasing trend seem to begin a few years prior to the 
reform. Conversely, we observe a decline in VSP-dropouts, for both genders. By 2008, 
the rate has gone down by 7.5 % for boys and 3 % for girls. An interesting point is 
observed in the difference between the study tracks for male students. Initially at 20 % 
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at the introduction of the reform, the program gap is reduced to only 6.4 % in 2008, the 
smallest margin of any county at any time in the sample.  
 
Similar trends are not observed at the national level. In Panel B we see that the national 
rate have tendencies of the same development as in Hordaland, though much more 
modest. Where the trend in Hordaland changes sharply in the second half of the period, 
the national rate have small variations from year to year. The gender-specific panel 
show that the male rate for GSP is relatively stable, while the rate for VSP declines 6.4 
% over the period. While the former shows a definitive deviation in trend for 
Hordaland, the latter seem to be more in accord with the national rate. The sudden 
change post-reform is not as apparent for VSP-males as some of the other groups. 
Similar to their male counterparts, girls in general studies programs have an increased 
dropout rate after 2005, similar too, though more modest, than Hordaland. The girls in 
vocational studies see an increase in the first half of the period, with a corresponding 
decline in the second half. In comparison, the Hordaland time series seem much more 
variable, perhaps a sign of limited data as this is by far the smallest group. We should 
note that there is reason to be concerned about the common trend assumption for some 
of the groups. From Panel C Column 2, it seems that comparing Hordaland to the 
national sample may not provide an adequate control group, especially for the girls. 
Similarly, the pre-treatment trend for girls in GSPs is not ideal. However, it is more so 
for the boys in both cases, for whom compelling changes in trends are observed in the 







6.1.2 Graphical analysis of the synthetic control 
To abate possible issues with the common trend assumption, comparing the Hordaland 
to the synthetic control group might shed more light on what happened after the reform. 
When implemented correctly the synthetic control gives the best approximation of what 
we could expect from Hordaland in the years 2005-2010, had they not switched to a 
school choice system. The estimated trend of ‘Synthetic Hordaland’ is illustrated in 
Figure 4. As discussed in 5.2.2., the panels demonstrate that some control groups are 
better fitted than others, with perhaps ‘Boys VSP’ being the least matching. For this 
group it is easy to spot deviations from the estimated trend. The best control groups are 
designed for the GSP groups, where pre-reform trends are generally parallel. For both 
boys and girls we see that the actual dropout rates observed in Hordaland exceed those 
estimated for the synthetic control. This implies, as above, that the reform worsened 
dropout rates for these groups, with the boys taking the hardest hit. In the latter case, the 
estimated trend is relatively stable, while observed rates are not at all. For female VSP-
students we see a substantial reduction in dropouts compared to the synthetic group. As 
in Figure 3, the interpretation for the total dropout rates remain inconclusive. Although, 
there are some spikes and lows in the observed rate, the overall trend seem to match the 
synthetic group. It is perhaps, reasonable to assume that when the effect could be 
different for the different study tracks that the overall net effect is ambiguous. Overall, 
Figure 3 and 4 suggests that the change in post-reform trends are most apparent for 
GSP-students. Those in vocational tracks lack suitable control groups which would 
allow for identification of treatment effects. This issue is not abated by the 








6.2 Basic regression results 
Here, the results from the DID-analysis discussed in chapter 5 are reported. In line with 
the issues discussed above, estimations for VSPs and the overall rates did not yield valid 
results, failing multiple robustness tests. The framework could not identify the presence, 
or lack, of effects in a way that would lead to meaningful inference. Hence, the study 
focus on GSP-students. A concern in this analysis is the potential for selection from 
VSP to GSP after the reform. It may not be unreasonable to assume that some students 
who previously chose not to attend an academic track program, perhaps because they 
didn’t care for their neighborhood school, are more likely to apply to GSP-schools after 
school choice is introduced. If so, the composition of the student mass post-reform 
might be skewed, which could exacerbate the effects of the reform if these students are 
more likely to drop out (or vice versa). Figure 1 illustrated a sharp increase in GSP-
attendance in the latter half of the 00’s. However, the same trend was apparent 
nationally, which indicates an overall shift in preferences not linked to the reform. To 
explore, I carried out a preliminary test where the reform effect on the share of students 
in academic programs was estimated using a similar DID-framework as the main 
analysis. No significance was found in the test, with an estimated p-value of 0.36240. 
Nevertheless, the concern should not be put to rest conclusively, but urge us to remain 
cautious of the inference of the analysis. 
 
Table 7 lists the baseline results. In the first estimations, no additional controls are used 
other than those of a standard DID-specification, as formulated in (6). However, I 
employ some tweaking in the level of trend control, and utilize three different variations 
of control groups. Panel A compares Hordaland to the national rate, where the 
coefficients listed refers to the difference-in-differences estimator (post x treatment). In 
Column (1) the specification simply makes the distinction between pre-treatment and 
post-treatment periods. The first row for this column reports an estimated coefficient of 
2.749 for boys in general study programs, which is significant at the 10 % level (with a 
p-value of 0.064). This implies that the introduction of school choice raised dropout 
rates for this group by multiple percent compared to the national trend.  
                                                 
40 Estimated treatment effect on share of GSP-students:  
?̂? = 1.60 SE = 1.75 P-value = 0.362   95 % CI = [-1.86 , 5.06] 
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Table 7: Estimated impact of the reform 
   
Panel A: Full sample   


















    
       County and year dummies  
 
No Yes Yes 
       County x Year trends No No Yes 
 







Observations 209      209                   209 
 
Panel B: PP-counties only 
  


























   
 County x year trends No No Yes 
 







Observations 110 110 110 
 
Panel C: Synthetic control 
  


























     
County x Year trends No No Yes 
 








22 22 22 
                            Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  
                                     The χ2-test measures if the coefficient for boys and girls are significantly different. 
                                    1 star = significant at the 10 % level, 2 stars = 5 %, 3 stars = 1 %  
                             




Similarly in Row 2, the estimated coefficient for their female counterparts is 1.229, 
which is a weaker effect than the boys. The estimates for the girls is significant at the 5 
% level. In general, these results imply that academic track students responded 
negatively to increased choice and competition, and more so for boys than for girls. 
However, when testing for significant differences in the estimates for boys and girls, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference, even at the 10 % level (Row 5). 
Therefore we cannot safely rule out the possibility that the higher estimates for boys are 
random variations.  
 
Column (2) estimates the same model using vectors of county- and year-specific 
dummies. This allows for control of mean differences in dropouts between counties, as 
well as overall year effects common among all observations. Using these controls do 
not change results drastically, suggesting that the initial specification is a reasonable 
approximation. Noteworthy is the fact that by employing this specification the precision 
increases. The estimates for boys and girls are significant at the 5 % and 1 % level 
respectively. This could indicate that these dummies help reduce noise from the time 
series, better identifying treatment effects.  
 
Column (3) employs both the dummies from Column (2), and dummies for county x 
time interactions, controlling for county-specific time trends as well. Using this 
specification the estimated coefficients for male GSP-students the coefficient is reduced 
to 1.749. For the girls in academic track studies, however, the effect is stronger than for 
Columns (1)-(2) by about 0.2 percent. Standard errors greatly increases in this model, 
limiting the girls’ coefficient to significance at the 10 % level. For the boys, the error 
term more than doubles, and no significance is consequently found. Thus, when 
including county-specific trends the effect of school choice reform on dropout rates 
cannot be measured with the same precision. A similar modelling issue is encountered 
by Besley and Burgess (2004), though on an unrelated issue. They argue that this could 
suggest that observations who display similar patterns in the policy of interest also have 
similar long-term trends. Thus, it might be school choice reforms driving the growth of 
these trends. On the other hand, it could also imply that there is difficulty in isolating 
the effect of the reform itself from other factors that might influence both the dropout 
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rates and whether school choice is allowed. In Besley and Burgess’ case the DID-
coefficient drops to zero, which indicates that no effect could be identified. This is not 
the case here, where a reasonably sized effect is estimated, but it cannot be done 
accurately. Hence we cannot exclude the possibility of the result being due to random 
shocks. A sample of 19 counties and 11 year might not be enough to achieve an 
asymptotic distribution in the presence of such county specific shocks41.  
 
Panel B narrows the control group to counties that employed a proximity principle 
throughout the entire decade, consequently reducing the number of control counties to 
nine42. Columns (1), (2) and (3) employs the same specification as for Panel A. From 
Table 7 we see that results do not differ greatly. In Column (1) we find the same 
significant effect as in Panel A, with a slightly higher coefficient for the boys. Column 
(2) posts estimates with a minor increase in standard errors, while we find similar issues 
as for Panel A in Column (3). Significant differences between the genders are not found 
in Panel B either, with p-values for Columns (1) and (2) at ~ 0.13. Overall there is not 
much difference in whether we use the full sample of all 19 counties, or limiting the 
control group to only PP-counties. Since the full sample is an adequate approximation 
and provides a larger sample size this specification is preferred in subsequent testing. 
 
In the final panel, I estimate the model using the synthetic control group constructed 
based on covariates. Since this control is a weighted combination of the most fitting PP-
counties, Hordaland is only compared to one other county. As such, the number of 
observations is reduced to 22 (one for each year, for each county). Panel C reveal that 
none of the estimations are significant using this approach. We do however see that the 
coefficients estimated are relatively similar to Panels A and B, but the standard errors 
are considerably larger, meaning that with cannot safely reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect. In this case, we could suspect the lack of precision in the estimates to stem from 
the limited number of observations. For example, Harrell Jr (2015) suggests that to 
expect a reasonable identification of effects, an model should contain 10-20 
observations for each parameter estimated. The estimation in Panel C barely meet this 
                                                 
41 Angrist and Pischke (2008) further details how such shocks can be problematic for DID inference. 
42 In this case: Østfold, Hedmark, Buskerud, Telemark, Vest-Agder, Sør-Trøndelag, Nord-Trøndelag, 
Nordland and Troms. 
48 
 
criterion, and tells us little about the effect that I aim to measure. Though the size of the 
estimated effect could be interpreted as encouraging, the results in this panel cannot be 
regarded as evidence in either direction.  
 
6.3 Robustness tests 
In this section, I provide a number of tests to substantiate the results in 6.2. If the results 
remain consistent with what is reported above, it may increase our confidence in the 
link proposed between school choice and dropout rates.  
 
6.3.1 Additional controls 
Firstly, I add additional controls to the basic regression analysis. By adding a vector of 
background characteristics we allow for more precision in the estimates, reducing the 
chance of confounding in the results. Table 8 lists the results with additional controls. In 
this specification, I’ve chosen to control for several of the background characteristics 
discussed in Chapter 4. This entails the inclusion of the percentage share of students 
with a minority background (Row 3), the share of students attending a private school 
(Row 4), the share of students participating in a vocational track program (Row 5), and 
the level of education in the population (Row 6-9). In addition, I’ve included the log of 
median income (Row 2) to control for changes in the overall wealth level in the county. 
The estimation is carried out using the same trend control as Column (3) of Table 7, 
meaning that time and county dummies plus the interaction is included. Columns (1) 
and (3) lists the baseline results from the previous estimation, while Column (2) and (4) 
reports estimates with additional controls for boys and girls respectively. The estimates 
remain consistent with the results from 6.2, with only a slight reduction in the 
coefficients of interest. Standard errors are reduced compared to Table 7, implying that 
by adding these controls we increase the precision of the estimates. The errors for boys 
are still fairly large, and it is possible that there are other confounding variables that are 
not included in this test. However, as before the coefficient for boys is found to be 
higher than for girls. Considering the theoretical assessment of school choice discussed 
in the literary review, this is in line with what we might expect. In general, it is a 




























      
Log of median income  56.596* 
(29.744) 
  36.776* 
(19.490) 
 




   
0.259* 
(0.133) 
      
Share in private school  0.201 
(0.178) 
  -0.031 
(0.140) 
      
Share in vocational programs  -0.375*** 
(0.122) 
  -0.329*** 
(0.070) 
 




   
-1.888 
(1.806) 
      




  -1.343 
(1.762) 
      




  0.825 
(1.671) 
      




  -1.404 
(2.195) 
 











      
County x Year trends Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 209 190  209 190 
         Note: DID-coefficient is estimated with county and year dummies, and time trends. Robust errors in 
                  parentheses.  
                 As some of the covariates only had data from 2001 onwards, this estimation has 19 fewer observations  
                1 star = significant at 10 % level, 2 stars = 5 %, 3 stars = 1 % 
         
          
With regards to the covariates there are some interesting results. For instance, Row 3 
show a positive correlation between the share of minority students and the dropout 
rates. This result is to be expected considering the studies discussed in the literary 
review where minority students, on average, were found to perform worse than native 
students (Lindbom, 2010). Hordaland’s low share of minority students (4.2 % at the 
time of the reform, compared to 10 % nationally) might partly explain why dropout 
rates in general were lower than the national average. However, the effect is imprecisely 
measured. Interestingly, we also observe no significant effect from the share of students 
                                                 
43 Only the test employing the full sample is reported in Table 8. A similar test using the PP-county 
specification did not differ in results. 
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in private schools. As previous studies have found, this group tend to outperform public 
school students, and as such should warrant a lower dropout rate, all else equal. This is 
not the case in this sample, and neither when looking specifically at Hordaland, which is 
somewhat surprising. It could be an indication of a lesser degree of academic 
segregation in Norwegian private schools than in other countries, partly explained by 
the fact that the majority of private institutions remain religious and pedagogical 
alternatives, and not direct competitors to public schooling per se. On the other hand, 
the amount of students in vocational tracks seem to have a positive effect on GSP-
students, reducing the dropout rate by -0.375 for boys and -0.329 for girls respectively. 
A central hypothesis in this thesis is that the competition spurring from school choice is 
disadvantageous towards academic tracks which are the most popular and thus faces the 
most competitive environment. If this is the case an increase in the share vocational 
track students should serve to decrease competition as fewer students compete for the 
same spots in GSPs, and in return reduce dropouts.  
 
6.3.2 Robustness of error terms 
In this test I employ the different strategies for correct estimation of the standard errors, 
detailed in Chapter 5. All three specifications from Table 7 are run, using the full 
sample as control. In Panel A the previously reported results from the baseline 
estimation are restated for comparison. Panel B displays results from regressions using 
clustering at the county level, which according to the discussion in 5.3.1. should be a 
natural level at which to cluster. By allowing for within-cluster correlation we observe 
that all estimations are found to be strongly significant, even for very high levels of 
confidence. At face value this might seem reassuring, but there are some troubling signs 
when using this strategy. Most notably, standard errors are drastically lowered in Panel 
B where clusters are used. This is opposite of what should be expected beforehand, and 
might suggest that the model is not suitable for clustering. An obvious suspect is that 
the number of clusters is too low. Cameron and Miller (2015) point out that this can be 
overcome by having many observations per cluster.  However, this might not be the 
case here either. With few clusters and limited observations, asymptotics have not 
kicked in, which could lead to the estimated variance, 𝑉𝑐𝑙𝑢(?̂?), being downwards-biased 




Table 9: Testing different standard error-strategies 
   
Panel A: Baseline   


















    
       County and year dummies  
 
No Yes Yes 
       County x Year trends No No Yes 
Observations 209      209                   209 
 
Panel B: Clustering 
  


























   
 County x year trends No No Yes 
Observations 209 209 209 
 
Panel C: Bootstrap 
  


























     
County x Year trends No No Yes 
Observations 
209 209 209 
                         Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
                                 1 star = significant at 10 % level, 2 stars = 5 %, 3 stars = 1 % 
 
They go on to discuss that when employing too few clusters, the OLS estimator could 
resort to ‘over-fitting’ of the model, systematically estimating errors too close to zero 
compared to the true error term. In Table 7 Column (3) we saw that including county 
specific trends led to sharp increases in the error terms, especially for boys. Results 
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from Panel B of Table 9 indicate that clustering the error terms leads the model to over-
fit this variability, which in turn could mean that the standard errors are greatly 
underestimated. It could also be put into question whether the county is an adequate 
level to cluster over. Effects might differ significantly in different parts of each county, 
specifically in the urban vs rural dimension. It might be unreasonable to assume within-
correlation for a county as a whole, if the correlation is in fact between smaller units. 
You could also argue that the municipalities containing large cities might have more in 
common with each other, than the more rural municipalities in the same county. A 
better option, had it been available, could seemingly have been to cluster over 
municipality, or even district, instead. The result is that the seemingly significant result 
from the cluster model should be interpreted with caution, and hardly as an 
improvement of the baseline results.  
 
Panel C report results using the bootstrap procedure outlined in section 5.3.2. Since this 
strategy involves performing an, obviously, finite number of simulations, and important 
question is how many simulations to run. In Efron and Tibshirani (1993) they argue that 
once the number of repetitions exceed 200 you start approaching the same statistics as 
infinity. Wilcox (2010), on the other hand, suggest that 599 is the magical number, and 
recommended for general use. Cameron and Miller (2015) vary between 1000 and 4000 
repetitions in their simulations. The main concern is to run enough for the asymptotic 
properties to be realized. To ensure this I ran 1500 repetitions, leading to the results in 
Table 944. We note that standard errors are higher for this strategy than for the baseline, 
in line with the expectation. For Columns (1) and (2), however, the difference between 
the two is small. This could imply that the initial estimations are a reasonable 
approximation of the true model. In some cases the small increase in standard errors 
barely pushes the p-values below common significance thresholds (for example below 
the 5 % significance level, notably for girls in Column (1) and boys in Column (2)). The 
fact that the results are very similar is reassuring though. In Column (3) we see that 
bootstrapping further increases the already large standard errors for the county-time 
interaction specification. As a result, the coefficient for girls is not significant at the 10 
% level as in the baseline results in Panel A. This column underlines the issues of this 
                                                 
44 Regressions with both fewer and more repetitions were run, with no discernible difference in the results 
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specification discussed in the sections above. It also demonstrates that red flags should 
be raised concerning the clustered strategy. In general the bootstrapping results suggest 
we should remain cautious, but not discouraged by the robustness of the baseline 
estimations.       
 
6.3.3 Placebo testing 
A threat to the identification of causal effects is the presence of anticipatory effects. In 
the Hordaland case that could mean inhabitants predicting the reform taking place and 
adjusting their behavior accordingly. For example, there might be some inter-county 
mobility as students and parents adjust to their preferences. Although moving in 
anticipation of increased school choice might seem drastic, we cannot safely rule it out 
on good faith. By employing a simple placebo we can test for pre-treatment effects by 
introducing the treatment at an earlier time. In doing so we should expect to not find 
significant effects if we believe our previous estimates are correct. I carry out such a test 
by limiting the period of focus the five years leading up to the reform, years 2000-2005. 
Treatment is introduced in 2003, using the full sample as the control. Results are 
reported in Table 10.  
Table 10: Results from placebo test 


























     
County x Year trends No No Yes 
Observations 
114 114 114 
                Note: Robust errors in parentheses  
                              1 star = significant at 10 % level, 2 stars = 5 %, 3 stars = 1 % 
 
 
This test was performed using the same three specifications as before. As we see, no 
coefficient were found to be significant in any case, which is reassuring. For the boys 
coefficient is found to be negative, which is also the case for girls when using the 
county-specific trends. Additional tests using 2002 and 2004 as the placebo yielded 




6.3.4 The timing of treatment effects 
Pischke (2005) provides a useful procedure for testing for the timing of effects by 
employing the Granger test approach of Autor (2003). He proposes to estimate the 
following equation 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑐𝑡(𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗) + 𝑿𝑐𝑡𝛿 + 𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑞
𝑗=−𝑚                   (7) 
where γc and λt refer to county specific trends, and year effects present among all 
observations, while Xct is an optional vector of background characteristics. The 
variables of interest are the dummies Dct which denote ‘leads’ and ‘lags’, time periods 
immediately before and after the treatment. Assume the reform occurs in period k. By 
adding m leads and q lags we can run a regression on (7), obtaining the coefficient βj for 
the jth period. In the absence of anticipatory effects we should expect to find that pre-
treatment coefficients to be zero, so that 𝛽𝑗 = 0  ∀ 𝑗 < 0. Ideally, we also want to 
observe a non-zero βj for j > 0, since the initial results indicated an effect. Table 11 
reports the results from this test.   
Table 11: Timing of treatment effects 
   
Leads and lags Boys  Girls 








   















   




   
Observations 209 209 
                                            Note: Robust errors in parentheses  
                                                     1 star = significant at 10 % level, 2 stars = 5 %, 3 stars = 1 % 
 
 
Estimation is carried out on the full sample using the same model as in Autor (2003) 
meaning that county and time dummies, but not additional covariates, are included. The 
leads and lags are equal to 1 in only one period each for the treatment group. The 
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exception to this is lag 3, which is 1 for years >=2008. As the initial placebo test above, 
the Granger test returns some reassuring results. For both boys and girls, the treatment 
effect appears when we would expect it, and increases in strength throughout the period. 
In Figure 6, the timing of treatment effects for GSP students are illustrated. As we see, 
the initial coefficient for boys is negative, before increasing rapidly in the following 
years. Some dynamics in the treatment effect is to be expected, and might be indicative 
of an adaptation process among students. The effect is strongest two years removed 
from the reform, for both genders. It remains positive for all lags, but increases in 
variance for Lag 3. Overall, the results from these increases our faith in the notion that 






6.3.5 External validity 
The sharp deviations in trends observed in Hordaland after the reform are not matched 
at the national level. An interesting question is whether this is a singular case, or if there 
is some general effect of switching from a PP- to a FSC-system. If so, we should expect 
similar effects to be found among other switching counties. To explore such a 
hypothesis I carry out a similar DID-estimation for other reforming counties, with 
results reported in Table 12. Here I estimate the effect of the change to FSC for three of 
the Switchers preceding Hordaland45. The specification is similar to that of Table 7, 
where county and year dummies are included, plus controls for county specific trends.  
 
Results from Rows 1-4 show that the estimations are imprecise in many cases, largely 
because of limited data and narrow pre-treatment windows. They do however point in 
the direction of a pattern of expected consequences from making the switch. In 
Akershus, Column (1) show similar effects as those observed in Hordaland. The boys in 
academic track programs are estimated to have a highly significant increase in dropouts 
from the reform. For the girls, only a small effect is estimated, which is not significant. 
No significance is neither found in Oppland, though the sign for both groups is positive, 
which we would expect in the case of a general effect. The effect is also estimated to be 
smaller for this county than Akershus. For Oslo the estimation is done in two 
installments. This is done to measure the effect of both the PP-reform in 2005 and the 
FSC-reform in 2008, as they underwent two changes during the period. Make especially 
note of Row 3. If school choice increases dropout rates, we should observe that the 
reverse case in Oslo in 2005 would lower them. Interestingly, the estimates show a 
reduction in dropouts for the PP-reform for male students, while no effect is found for 
the girls. However, a negative effect is also found in the estimation for the FSC-reform 
in 2008, the FSC-reform. This is the only that result that is contrary to what we might 
expect, but we do note a substantial standard error. For the girls a coefficient in line 
with expectations and similar to the other cases is found, but with high standard errors 
as well. In general, the data shows that the trend for girls in Oslo follows the national 
trend closely, which would suggest few effects identifiable from the reform.   
                                                 
45 Since Møre og Romsdal made the switch in 2001, the data does not allow for analysis of pre-treatment 
trends. Hence, this county is excluded in this analysis and test.  
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Table 12: DID-estimation for other switching counties 













   

















   
Test difference (P > χ2) 
 
0.230 
Observations 209 209 
                                              Note: Robust errors in parentheses  
                                                       1 star = significant at 10 % level, 2 stars = 5 %, 3 stars = 1 % 
 
In Row 4 I employ a model where the effect of introducing school choice is estimated 
using the three counties plus Hordaland as treatment groups for whom the treatment 
occurs at different times, using the same controls as before46. The effect found for male 
GSP-students is an estimated increase in dropout rates of 1.38 % after a reform of this 
kind. We should take in to account that there is some imprecision to this result, with a p-
value of 0.11, though it is consistent both in size and direction with the other results of 
this thesis. Effects are also found for the girls, though to a lesser degree than the boys, 
which are significant at the 10 % level. This is in line with what we observe in 
Hordaland, where the strongest negative effect appears to be on the boys. However, as 
before, the gender difference is not statistically significant (see Row 6), with a higher p-
value than that for the baseline results of Table 7. Both separate and combined we see 
indications that similar effects can be found in the other cases, pointing in the direction 
of a general effect. However, the scope of this test is too small and superficial to arrive 
at any conclusions.  
 
Hordaland’s comparability to the other counties might explain some of the differences 
in the results. For example, Oppland separates from the other Switchers by having a 
                                                 
46 This approach is similar to that of Besley and Burgess (2004) 
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smaller, more rural population. There are no city at the level of Bergen and Oslo, which 
suggests that the effects of school choice might be different in these counties than 
others47. This might explain why we only find small effects for this observation. 
Hordaland, Akershus and Oslo are more similar in size and population, in addition to 
containing large metropolitan areas. On the other hand, their inhabitants differ 
compositionally. For example, Akershus and Oslo have a much more heterogeneous 
population, both in terms of ethnicity and socioeconomic status. It is therefore not 
obvious that the segregational effects of school choice is equal in the three counties. It is 
possible that the adverse effects of school choice is stronger in areas where the 
segregation is already stronger, perhaps implied by the relatively stronger effect found 
on dropout rates among male GSP-students in Akershus than in Hordaland. Such a 
question should garner interest for further analysis. 
  
                                                 





Chapter 6 suggests a possible link between students in general study programs dropping 
out and the school choice reform. Why could this be the case? The following Chapter 
looks at possible mechanisms that could explain such results, and discuss how these 
relate to existing literature on the subject. Alternative explanations are also explored, 
especially the possible confounding effect of the legalization of private schools. Lastly, 
the policy implications of adverse effects are explored.  
 
7.1 Mechanisms 
In general, a school choice system will result in some form for skill-sorting process. The 
most popular schools will be those who are perceived as providing the best education, 
attracting the students with the highest grades and abilities. These students will 
subsequently benefit from having high-ability peers, with a conversely negative effect 
on those in less popular schools (Epple and Romano, 1998). Through this self-sorting, 
the market perception might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the most popular 
schools become the best schools by getting the best students and teachers. The central 
hypothesis of this thesis was that increased levels of competition in the educational 
market will affect boys and girls differently. The results of the DID-analysis show that 
both genders responded negatively to the reform. The estimated effect is strongest for 
the boys, though this difference is not found to be statistically significant. However, the 
fact that the coefficient is consistently estimated to be larger than that for the girls 
suggest that the treatment effect is perhaps larger for boys.   
 
The evaluation reported in AUD (2005) indicated that the school choice reform led to a 
process where the strongest students outside Bergen applied to the popular schools in 
the city center, while the weaker students have to settle for more rurally located schools. 
11.2 % of students who had their neighborhood school as their top choice did not earn 
admission, but was referred to their other choices. Of these, students in the bottom half 
of the grade distribution were severely overrepresented, and over 50 % of them living in 
central Bergen (AUD, 2005 p. 16). For students who preferred other schools than their 
local one, about ¼ did not get their top choice. In this group, students in the second-to-
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best tier (4.0 – 4.9 GPA range) were the majority. Both these groups should be expected 
to be vulnerable to drop out. As boys are especially overrepresented among low-
achieving students, these would be expected to be in the majority in the second-tier 
schools. Autor et. al (2016) noted how boys respond more to poor school inputs, 
increasing their risk of dropping out. Furthermore, Legewie and DiPrete (2012) argued 
that since boys are more susceptible to the inputs of their peer-groups, they are more 
vulnerable to let such clustering affect their academic performance. As the best students 
leave for the most popular schools, an adverse selection of peer groups form in the less 
popular schools. The report also features feedback from the teachers in various districts 
on the perceived quality of the educational environment at their school. Following the 
reform, the city center schools have been characterized by an increasingly homogeneous 
group of students with very high academic standards. Some teachers reported that the 
students are ‘breathing down their neck’ academically, pushing for better and more 
advanced curriculum. In schools outside the immediate city center, teachers report a 
worsening in class environment. They attribute this to the departure of the students 
maintaining the academic standard in class, leaving a higher percentage of students with 
low motivation and low skills behind.  
 
These reports suggests that the effects of the reform is strongest for the best and the 
weakest students, in opposite directions48. It is reasonable to assume that a large part of 
the increase in dropouts comes from weaker students being deferred to a less preferred 
choice, where the educational quality is lower. The lack of motivation is also apparent 
in the feedback from students who were not admitted to their top choice. In AUD (2005, 
p. 22) when asked why they were dissatisfied with the school choice system, many 
students responded that their current school was only their second or third choice, and 
that they “didn’t even want to go to this school”. The most common objection among 
the dissatisfied students was however the length of commute, with almost 50 % 
reporting this as their main issue. A central claim from opponents of school choice in 
Hordaland is that the weakest students are forced to endure long commutes because the 
spots at their local school are taken by stronger students. Especially those in Bergen city 
center are vulnerable to such displacement, having to settle for schools further away 
                                                 
48 Teachers in mid-tier schools reported no significant change in their class environment. 
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from home. They argue that this puts extra strain on those already at risk of quitting, 
increasing the likelihood that dropout rates will increase. Burdick-Will (2015) finds that 
it is students from disadvantaged neighborhoods who tend to have the longest commute, 
as students from backgrounds of higher social status often live near popular, high 
quality schools. She points out that the privilege to choose is equally the privilege not to 
have to choose, but being able to stay in your local community, maintaining established 
relations. Bierhaum and Barajas (2017) on the other hand, argues that the burden of 
increased travel distance is a common criticism against school choice systems, which 
serves to exacerbate, rather than reduce inequality among students. As this thesis points 
out, the de facto choice for the weakest students is limited, at least when considering the 
contested schools in and around Bergen. For students located near the city center the 
likelihood of getting accepted to a school close to home decreases as the GPA 
decreases. The weakest students applying to GSP-schools are thus most at risk of being 
placed in a school to which they have a long commute. This will be the case for both 
genders, but because boys are more prevalent in this segment they will outnumber the 
girls. The increased travel distance, combined with the lack of motivation from not 
getting admitted to their top choice and the adverse selection of peer groups provides a 
plausible hypothesis for why increased dropout rates are observed after the reform in 
Hordaland, and why the effect appears to be stronger for boys than for girls. With a 
more detailed data source, preferably at the individual level, on grades, location, school 
application, background etc., such a hypothesis could be tested and substantiated by 
empirical analysis. Unfortunately the available data and scope for this thesis does not 
allow for such analysis, but should be a topic of interest for future research. 
 
7.2 Alternative explanations 
There are severable variables that might influence dropout rates. For example, the 
income and level of education for parents are found to be positively correlated with a 
child’s academic abilities49. Thus, we would expect counties with a high degree of 
highly educated to have a lower rate of dropouts, all else equal. If large changes took 
                                                 
49 Reardon (2011) discusses recent developments in the achievement gap between children of high-
income and low-income households.  
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place around the time of the reform it might contradict the hypothesis that school choice 
has an effect on dropout rates. 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrate the development in income and education in the population during the 
decade in question. The level of education is relatively stable throughout the period. The 
significant trend is a slow reduction in the share of the population who only have 
completed compulsory education, and a steady increase of those with a university 
education. These changes are likely related to the overall trend of increased attainment 
of education. We observe no changes around the time of the reform. On the other hand, 
the growth in median income seem to increase in pace around 2005. A similar change of 
pace is, however, present for Norway as a whole, which indicate that this is the result of 
a general improvement in wealth in the second half of the 00’s and not specific for 
Hordaland.   
 
Another factor that could influence the dropout rate is the amount of minority students 
in the schools. From 2001 to 2010 this share rose from 2.8 to 6.2 % in Hordaland, which 
represents more than a doubling. However, it is still below the national rate, which in 
comparison rose from 7.2 to 13.4 % in the same period. If we disregard Oslo and 
Akershus county, minority students are evenly distributed among the counties, with 
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Hordaland on an average level. In both cases the majority of the growth happens at the 
end of the period, which does not correspond with the timing of the increase in 
dropouts.  
 
The other major policy change in the education sector in 2005 was the legalization of 
private institutions which do not offer a pedagogical or religious alternatives. This 
allowed private actors to supply education in direct competition with the public sector. 
Despite this, the overall share of students choosing a private education remained modest 
in Norway, with an increase from 5 % in 2005 to 7.3 % in 2010. The private schools 
remain few in number and are mostly concentrated in the larger cities. Per 2016, Oslo 
has the highest proportions of students in private high schools at 16 %, while Hordaland 
has a 15 % share. The majority of these schools are located in, and around, Bergen city 
center. After 2005, the city saw a sharp increase in private school attendance, leading to 
one of the highest shares in the country. This is illustrated in Figure 750. In 2010 over 40 
% of Bergen girls and a quarter of Bergen boys were in a private school. The share has 
been increasing in recent years as well, and in 2015 almost half of all students in upper 
secondary education in downtown Bergen were in a private school, with the girls 
increasingly outnumbering the boys (Statistics Norway, 2016c). These numbers are 
remarkably high by Norwegian standards, and separates the situation in Bergen from 
that in many other cities.  
 
In the literary review, some results suggest that private schools increase performance, 
both for the student and the school sector in general. Thus, we might expect to see lower 
rates of dropouts in counties where there is a larger degree of students in these schools. 
However, in Hordaland we observe an increase in enrollment in private schools 
simultaneously as dropout rates increase among GSP-students. In line with the 
theoretical assessments of school choice, we can assume that two mechanisms are in 
effect. Firstly, the increased competition from private actors should improve effort 
among public schools, spurring efficiency gains and improved quality of education 
                                                 
50 I’ve categorized the following schools as located in Bergen city center: Private – Akademiet, Bergen 
Private Gymnas, Danielsen Intensivgymnas, Danielsen videregående skole, Sonans and St. Paul. Public – 
Amalie Skram, Bergen Katedralskole, Bergen Maritime, Bergen Tekniske Fagskole, Bergens 
Handelsgymnasium, Bjørgvin, Kyrre and Tanks.  
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overall. All else equal, studies like Figlio and Hart (2010) suggest that this should lower 
dropout rates. The uncharacteristically high take-up of private education indicate that 
these schools are desirable among Hordaland students, and are at least perceived as high 
quality schools in the market. If they are in fact better educators than the public school, 
and a large portion of students attends these schools, we should expect performances to 
improve further. However, the data on which this thesis is based includes combined 
numbers for private and public schools. As we observe the dropout rates among GSP-
students increase sharply post-reform it seems implausible that there are significant 
gains from the high share of private school students. At the very least, the net effect for 
the general study programs (which is primarily what the private schools offer) is 
negative.  
 
As discussed above, there is a second mechanism is at play through the sorting process 
of the school choice system. If the private schools are perceived as better, these will be 
preferred by the strongest students. If so is the case, we should expect to find clustering 
of high ability students in private schools, and low ability students in public schools. 
Figure 7 shows that girls increasingly outnumber boys in private schools. As boys 
outnumber girls in (perceived) lesser-quality public schools, dropout rates might rise 
through the adverse selection of peer groups. This implies that the sharp increase in 
private school attendance might accentuate the mechanisms described in 7.1, not 
contradict them. In the absence of the school choice reform, a skill-sorting process 
between private and public education might still appear, with adverse effects on those 
left in a public institution. If so is the case, this provides a plausible explanation for why 
similar effects as those observed in Hordaland are not as dramatic in other switching 
counties, because they have not experienced a similar increase in the private educational 









7.3 Policy implications 
School choice continues to be controversial. The Norwegian debate on educational 
policy is primarily focused on reducing dropouts. Results indicating that school choice 
increases dropouts could therefore be taken as argument in favor of adjustments to the 
system. While opponents hope for the reintroduction of the proximity principle, signals 
from the newly elected Labor Party indicate that the current system will continue for 
now, with some minor changes51.  
 
A County Parliament assessment of the admission system makes a note of the objective 
to promote diversity in the student mass at each school, and that FSC has not been 
successful in doing so (Haugsdal, 2016 p. 2). In order to achieve a more balanced 
distribution of students, some suggest that a mix of FSC and PP could be employed. 
Examples from other counties include giving the students priority at their neighborhood 
school, while maintaining the option to apply to others. Admission among external 
applicants will be decided after all priority students have been allocated. Supporters 
argue that such a system will eliminate the potential risk factors of long commutes and 
weaker students being forced to attend schools they do not prefer by guaranteeing them 
at spot in their own community. On the other hand, objectors point out that it could 
exacerbate the issues of school choice, as the spots open to outside applicants will be in 
short supply. The GPA needed to be able to get accepted to a school that is not local 
will be even higher, effectively ensuring that school choice is only a choice for the very 
best students, or those who happen to live near them. Haugsdal (2016) also note that 
prior to the reform in 2005 there were problems in ensuring that the local schools had 
capacity to accommodate all neighboring students. Thus, there were cases where 
students were moved to other schools, or there had to be some form of selection process 
based on the grade distribution. When considering alternative systems one has to 
account for such challenges, specifically concerning how many students will have to 
commute, or how students who would prefer their neighborhood school, but are 
displaced by other priority students, will respond. Haugsdal considers it likely that the 
                                                 
51 With the new stipulations, students facing an ‘unreasonable commute’ will be given a discretionary 
assessment for admission to their neighborhood school. Students will also be given the right to continue 
at their current schools for VG2 and VG3, if they wish to do so. See Krane Hansen (2016) 
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academically weakest students will be the ones having to settle for other schools. The 
main issue, as the County Parliament sees it, is limited capacity. Specifically in Bergen, 
demand exceeds supply to great degrees in several schools. AUD (2005) also found that 
the majority of students who had their local school as the top choice, but did not earn 
admittance, were living in Bergen city. An increase in capacity could mitigate the 
problems by allowing more of these students to attend a school closer to home. We 
could also expect an increase in supply to lower the GPA required at other schools52, 
improving the chances of the second-to-best students who were overrepresented among 
those applying to schools outside their neighborhood, but not getting admitted. 
Improving the likelihood that more students are able to attend their preferred school 
could prove advantageous towards preventing negative outcomes.    
 
As a result of the disproportionate amount of male dropouts, reducing dropout rates will 
inevitably involve reducing the gender gap. However, it is not obvious that this should 
be cause for policy intervention. Pekkarinen (2012) raises a question of whether the 
boys are declining, or simply stalling, allowing girls to make up for the bias of previous 
decades53. There are however some arguments in favor of targeting boys in particular. 
The literature show that boys have a more elastic response to external inputs, and are 
thus more vulnerable to the effects of a school choice system. Policy that works in their 
disfavor could therefore have a greater impact on outcomes like dropout rates than in 
the reverse case. On the other hand, Pekkarinen argues that because of their 
overrepresentation at the bottom of the grade distribution, boys might simply be a proxy 
for ‘low performing students’. Any effort to address an issue for this group of students 
will necessarily be an effort reduce the gender gap. Focus should thus be on reducing 
dropout rates for the weakest students in general, and not specific to genders.  
 
How to best address the low performing students is a complex issue. Many point to the 
need for sufficient resources in the school, to allow for more individually adapted 
teaching and enhanced support. A much debated topic in that regard is class size, where 
                                                 
52 Excluding, perhaps, the very most popular ones.  
53 On the other hand, studies such as that of Autor and Wasserman (2013) have found that educational 




the effect of smaller classes is not yet settled in the literature. Notable contributions 
from Chetty et al. (2011) and Fredriksson et al. (2013) do however find positive effects 
from reducing class sizes. Interestingly, the effect is found to be stronger on boys than 
girls, suggesting that increased funding to allow for more teachers could be 
advantageous in reducing the gender gap. Another popular measure is programs 
targeting struggling students at an early age, though studies find mixed results 
concerning their efficiency54. Regardless, such early intervention remains popular 
among policy makers. The significance of early childhood development in determining 
life outcomes is becoming increasingly well documented, accentuating the need for 
effort at young ages to reduce lagging. Hence, targeted policy intervention at the high 
school level in an effort to reduce dropouts might be too little too late.  
 
A possible quick fix targeted at underachieving males could come in the form of 
quotation. Such mechanisms have already been implemented for some cases at the 
university level, where students applying to degrees that is overwhelmingly skewed 
towards one gender have been awarded extra credit55. An equally unbalanced 
distribution of gender could encourage similar measures to be tested for applications to 
high schools56. In a recent White paper on equality, the governmental parties 
acknowledge the possibility of awarding gender points for study programs where the 
student mass consist of 80 % or more of one gender (Ministry of Children and Equality, 
2015). It is conceivable that this could reduce the gender gap in the most extreme cases, 
notably at the top and bottom of the grade distribution, though it would not solve the 
underlying issue of boys being more likely to fall behind and drop out. The temporary 
nature of such a measure is a likely explanation of why it has only garnered modest 
popularity among policy makers.  
 
                                                 
54 For example, Ludwig and Miller (2007) examine the comprehensive Head Start program in the US, but 
fail to find conclusive evidence of long term effects in educational outcomes. In contrast, Knudsen et. al. 
(2006) reports that several programs have shown to have significant impact on children’s early 
development of skills 
55 Female students applying for technical engineering degrees, and males applying to veterinary studies 
are some examples of groups that have been favored.  
56 An example of such unbalance was reported in another major city, Stavanger, where the intake of 
students to the highest ranked school consisted of 84 % girls (Birkemo, 2016). 
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8 Concluding remarks 
 
The thesis aims to measure the effect of a school choice reform in Hordaland County. 
By creating a competitive market for education, we would expect some individuals to 
thrive more than others. Therefore, we might observe different effects of the reform on 
different groups. I examine if this is the case for gender. Results of the study points to 
the introducing of school choice having and adverse effects on students in academic 
track programs. The effect was found to be stronger for boys, where estimates showed 
an increase in dropouts of 1.7-2.7 %, compared to an estimate of 1.2-1.5 % for girls, 
though the difference is not statistically significant. Considering a pre-treatment dropout 
rate of ~ 6-7 % and 5-6 % respectively, the effect should be viewed as considerable. For 
neither GSP nor VSP-groups a reduction in dropouts could be identified. This is 
contrary to several existing studies, which have found efficiency gains when allowing 
for school choice. However, the possibility of positive outcomes for other variables 
should not be ruled out.  
 
The treatment effect of the reform was explored in a difference-in-differences 
framework. The identifying assumption in this model is that of the parallel trend, 
meaning that in the absence of treatment we would observe similar trends for the treated 
and the control. A comparable pre-treatment trend is therefore imperative for the 
validity of the analysis. Assessments of this showed that the assumption holds 
reasonably well for the academic track programs, but less so for vocational programs. 
Hence, an effect can only be identified for the former group, while results from the 
latter could not be considered with any certainty. Estimates were found to hold up well 
under some robustness tests, proving to be fairly consistent. There are however some 
issues with certain specification, which perhaps stems from limitations of the data 
leading to a lack of precision in the identification. The treatment effect for GSP-students 
is however perfectly timed with the introduction of the reform, strengthening the 
hypothesis that the increase in dropouts in the latter half of the 00’s can be traced to the 




Student’s right to choose schools remain a key ideological battleground. Yet, the 
economic arguments in favor of such systems are contested. The main concern is the 
potential for clustering of students according to skill, effectively creating a tiered 
hierarchy in school quality. Existing data suggests that the weakest students benefits 
least from school choice, and present the greatest risk of dropping out. In Hordaland, 
they were found more likely to not get accepted at the schools they preferred, especially 
those living in Bergen, and more likely to have to endure long commutes. Both factors 
are likely contributors to an increased risk of dropping out at later stages. Since boys are 
overrepresented both among low skill students and dropouts, an effort to reduce dropout 
rates will also be an effort to reduce the gender gap. When girls on average earn better 
grades than boys, we would expect a school choice system to impact the latter group 
more, exacerbating the gender gap in the process.  
 
There are some policy measures that could abate the problem. They key issue of low 
performing students, particularly boys, at the secondary level must be tackled before 
applications to schools are sent out. Some underline the importance of early intervention 
to reduce the risk of students falling behind and lagging throughout their schooling 
years. School choice in itself might not cause the divergence between groups of 
students, but rather serve to accentuate differences that are already present. Efforts to 
decrease the gender gap at earlier grades should be of primary concern. For the supply 
of education at the high school level an increase in capacity in Bergen city center could 
reduce both dropout rates and the gender gap. Increasing the likelihood of students 
getting admitted to the school of their preference will likely also increase their chances 
of completing their education. Increased supply could also mean a decrease in the GPA 
required for the popular GSP-schools, promoting heterogeneity in the student mass.  
 
Considering the political attention given the topic and the amount of questions that still 
surrounds the effects of school choice, continued research should be warranted. This 
thesis contributes to an ongoing debate on how to mitigate adolescents falling out of 
school, especially when it comes to males. Although the analysis in this thesis has 
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A. Overview of schools in Hordaland 
Table A.1 lists all schools at the upper secondary level in Hordaland in the period 2000-
d.d.  
 
Note that not all schools are still operational. Some have merged, while some have been 
closed, giving place to new ones.  
 
Institutions with several locations are listed for each of them.  
 
 
Table A.1: List of schools in Hordaland  
Name Ownership Bergen 
Municipality 
City center 
Akademiet Bergen Private Yes Yes 
Amalie Skram VGS Public Yes Yes 
Arna Gymnas Public Yes No 
Arna Yrkesskole, Avd. Storaneset Public Yes No 
Arna Yrkesskole, Avd. Ulfsnesøy Public Yes No 
Askøy VGS Public No No 
Austevoll VGS Public No No 
Austrheim VGS Public No No 
Bergen Katedralskole Public Yes Yes 
Bergen Maritime VGS Public Yes Yes 
Bergen Private Gymnas Private Yes Yes 
Bergen Tekniske Fagskole Public Yes Yes 
Bergen Handelsgymnasium Public Yes Yes 
Bjørgvin VGS Public Yes Yes 
Bømlo VGS Public No No 
Danielsen Intensivgymnsa Private Yes Yes 
Danielsen VGS Private Yes Yes 
Bergen Maritime Fagskole Public Yes Yes 
Etne VGS Public No No 
Fana Gymnas Public Yes No 
Fitjar VGS Public No No 
Framne Kristne VGS Private No No 
Fusa VGS Public No No 
Fyllingsdalen VGS Public Yes No 
Garnes VGS Public Yes No 
Hjeltnes Gartnarskule Public No No 
Hop VGS Private No No 
Knarvik VGS Public No No 
Kongshaug Musikkgymnas Private No No 
Kristianborg VGS Private Yes No 
Krohnsminde VGS Public Yes No 
Krokeidesenteret  Private Yes No 
Kvinnherad VGS Public No No 
Kyrre Skole Public Yes Yes 
Laksevåg Gymnas Public Yes No 
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Laksevåg VGS Public Yes No 
Hordaland Helsefagskole Public No No 
Langhaugen VGS Public Yes No 
Lindås Gymnas Public No No 
Lønborg VGS Public Yes No 
Nordahl Griegs VGS Public Yes No 
Norheimsund VGS Public No No 
Odda VGS Public No No 
Olsvikåsen VGS Public Yes No 
Os Gymnas Public No No 
Os VGS Public No No 
Osterøy VGS Public No No 
Rogne VGS Public No No 
Rubbestadneset VGS Public No No 
Rudolf Steinerskolen Bergen Private Yes No 
Sandsli VGS Public Yes No 
Slåtthaug VGS Public Yes No 
Sonans VGS Bergen Private Yes Yes 
Sotra VGS Public No No 
St. Paul Skole Private Yes Yes 
Steinerskolen Skjold Private No No 
Stend Jordbrukskole Public Yes No 
Stord VGS Public No No 
Stord Yrkes- og tekniske skole Public No No 
Tanks VGS Public Yes Yes 
Tertnes VGS Public Yes No 
U. Pihl VGS Public Yes No 
Voss Gymnas Public No No 
Voss Husflidskule Public No No 
Voss Jordbrukskule Public No No 
Voss VGS Public No No 
Øystese Gymnas Public No No 
Årstad VGS Public Yes No 






B. School choice in Norway 
Table A.2 details which counties employs school choice in the period 2000-2010. For 
those switching systems during the 00’s it is noted in the table. 
 
The classification of counties in FSC and PP-groups is my own based on available 
information (see for example Stortingets Utredningsseksjon (2003). 
FSC: Free school choice         PP: Proximity principle 
 
Table A.2: List of high school admission systems 
County System Note 
Østfold PP  
Akershus FSC Changed in 2003 
Oslo FSC PP in 2005-08 
Hedmark PP  
Oppland FSC Changed in 2003 
Buskerud PP  
Vestfold FSC  
Telemark PP  
Aust-Agder FSC  
Vest-Agder PP  
Rogaland FSC  
Hordaland FSC Changed in 2005 
Sogn og Fjordane FSC  
Møre og Romsdal FSC Changed in 2001 
Sør-Trøndelag PP  
Nord-Trøndelag PP  
Nordland PP  
Troms PP  
Finnmark FSC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
